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Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry
William A. Birdthistle

*

Recent allegations of malfeasance in the investment management industry—markettiming, late-trading, revenue-sharing, and several others—involve a broad range of mutual fund
operations. This Article seeks to explain the common source of these irregularities by focusing
upon a trait they share: the practice of investment advisers’ capitalizing upon their managerial
influence to increase assets under management in order to generate greater fees from those
assets. This Article extends theories of executive compensation into the context of investment
management to understand the extraction of rents by mutual fund advisers. Investment advisers,
as collective groups of portfolio managers, interact with the boards of trustees of mutual funds
in ways analogous to the dealings of business executives with corporate boards of directors. In
this setting, the managerial power hypothesis of executive compensation provides a useful
paradigm for understanding distortions in arm’s-length bargaining between investment advisers
and fund boards, as well as limitations of the market’s ability to ensure optimal contracting
between those parties.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the heaviest outpouring of criticism in its history,
the investment management industry has been punished with
handsome profits and proposals for a lucrative future stream of Social
Security revenues. The year following New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer’s September 2003 accusation of malfeasance in mutual
funds was truly an annus horribilis for those funds and the financial
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houses that invest the funds’ money.1 Prior to Spitzer’s announcement,
investment advisers2—firms of professional money managers who
collectively manage more than $7 trillion in assets and advise more
than 8000 mutual funds3—had enjoyed general approbation for the
way in which they ran their businesses.4 Indeed, while much of
corporate America suffered through its own outbreak of accounting
malfeasance, commentators hailed mutual funds (owned by ninety-one
million investors living in nearly half of all U.S. households5) and their
unique structure as models of corporate governance.6 Spitzer’s press
conference, however, triggered an unceasing tide of opprobrium,
which has flowed over the investment management industry and
befouled its reputation.
But as the market has recuperated since then, the indignation has
ebbed. Shareholders seem to have forgiven any enormities and
returned to invest anew and to share in the funds’ success.7 Yet
structural flaws in the industry remain. And with the tremendous
amount of assets invested in mutual funds, spiced with the possibility
that Social Security reform might some day direct an additional $65
billion into personal fund accounts each year,8 the late transgressions
1.
See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State
Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release, Eliot
Spitzer], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html.
2.
Although the term “investment adviser” may be understood colloquially to refer
to an individual who manages money, the term as used in the mutual fund industry and this
Article refers to a professional business organization staffed by such individuals. The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) defines “investment adviser” to mean “any
person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities” and
“person” to mean “a natural person or a company.” Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L.
No. 768, §§ 202(a)(11), (16), 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11), (16)
(2000)). It is in the latter sense of a company that this Article uses the term “investment
adviser.”
See INV. CO. INST., 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1, 13 (44th ed. 2004).
3.
See Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Independent Directors: A Model for
4.
Corporate America?, PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 2003, at 2, 12.
5.
See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 79-80.
See Phillips, supra note 4, at 2, 12.
6.
See, e.g., Laura Johannes, Strong Performers Suffer Less in Mutual-Fund
7.
Scandals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C1; David Serchuk, Fund Companies: After the Fall,
FORBES, Jan. 14, 2005, available at http://www.forbes.com/strategies/2005/01/14/cz_ds_
0114sf.html (“More than a year after the mutual fund industry got into trouble for late-trading
and market-timing practices, shares of some of the offending fund companies have bounced
back nicely.”).
See Tom Lauricella, In Bush Plan, Who Will Do the Managing?, WALL ST. J., Feb.
8.
4, 2005, at C1 (“Robert Pozen, chairman of MFS Funds and a member of the presidential
commission that backed private accounts, estimates that about $65 billion will flow into the
accounts every year.”). Of course, until any Social Security plan is successfully adopted,
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compel a serious appraisal of the industry’s architectural vulnerabilities.
After presenting an introduction to the charges against mutual
funds, the unique structures of these funds, and the dynamics at work
in the alleged malfeasance, this Article in Part II provides background
on the components and organization of the investment management
industry, beginning with a brief history of its development in the
United States and a discussion of the rationales that encourage
investment in pooled vehicles. Part III argues that the relationship
between mutual fund boards of trustees and the investment advisers
that those boards hire can best be understood within the paradigm of
executive compensation. Part III then considers what the prevailing
model of executive compensation, the optimal contracting approach,
might predict when deployed in the investment advisory context. Part
IV explores the limitations of the optimal contracting approach and,
finding that theory wanting, suggests that another theoretical approach,
the managerial power hypothesis, which has heretofore been confined
to the operating company9 context, might apply with equal or greater
force in the mutual fund setting. Part V examines the malfeasance
exposed by the recent industry investigations and argues that the
behavior in question can best be understood as camouflaged extraction
of compensation from fund shareholders. The Article concludes that
recently proposed and adopted regulatory reforms are, and will
continue to be, inadequate to the task of vitiating the influence of
investment advisers and the conflicts of interest that currently pervert
those advisers’ incentives to the detriment of shareholders.

industry executives have an incentive to diminish estimates of potential inflows to avoid
appearing rapacious. Conversely, opponents of Social Security reform have an incentive to
inflate the figures to suggest that reforms involving personal accounts are driven by the
financial industry’s desire for profit. Other estimates suggest that $75 billion or more would
flow into personal accounts. See Peter Bucci, Bush Plan Could Add $75B to Funds
Annually, IGNITES, Nov. 8, 2004, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20041108/bushplan_
could-funds.annually (“Ken Worthington, an analyst at CIBC World Markets, expects 100
million of 130 million taxpayers to invest some of their Social Security money in private
accounts. Contributions will likely average $750 a year, assuming an annual cap of $1,000.
In comparison, he says, the fund industry took in some $200 billion annually from 1996 to
2003.”).
9.
The term “operating company” is used in the investment management industry—
and this Article—to refer to a typical company other than an investment company or mutual
fund; that is, a company outside the investment management business whose primary purpose
is the provision of goods or services and not simply the investment of assets. Cf. Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000) (setting forth the definition
of “investment company” under the 1940 Act).
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In the past two and a half years, federal and state investigators
have alleged that investment advisers—including many of the most
well-respected firms in the business, such as Putnam Investments
(Putnam), Alliance Capital (Alliance), and Massachusetts Financial
Services (MFS), to name but a few—have indulged in a feast of
abuses, including illicitly abetting private investors in arbitraging
mutual funds to the detriment of other fund shareholders;10 failing to
“fair value” the worth of assets under their management;11 permitting
favored shareholders to buy and sell fund shares illegally after the daily
trading deadline;12 selectively disclosing the holdings of securities in
their funds’ portfolios to preferred clients;13 appropriating shareholder
assets to boost fund sales and, in turn, their own advisory fees;14 and,
perhaps not surprisingly, destroying evidence of the aforementioned
abuses.15
Spitzer sounded the first ominous note on September 3, 2003,
when he held a press conference to announce a complaint alleging the
10. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Mass. Fin. Servs. Co.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347, 82 SEC Docket 341 (Feb. 5, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm.
11. See, e.g., Alison Sahoo, SEC Probe: Pricing Problems Widespread, IGNITES,
Mar. 24, 2004, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040324/probe_pricing_problems_
widespread (“More than half of the 961 global funds and 219 complexes that responded
to an SEC inquiry letter used fair-valuation procedures less than five times in the
past 20 months. Another 277 funds, or 31% of the respondents, didn’t use fair
valuation at all during that time.”).
12. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas & Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Closes Mutual Fund
Intermediary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at C1 (“The regulators in the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency coordinated their decision to close Security Trust with Mr.
Spitzer’s office and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which both announced their
own actions yesterday. The S.E.C. accused the company and three former executives of
facilitating hundreds of illegal trades by hedge funds managed by Edward J. Stern, who
reached a settlement with Mr. Spitzer in early September.”).
13. See, e.g., Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks Before the ICI General Membership Meeting (May 20, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch052004pfr.htm (“In addition, as the fund industry was
resisting efforts to require more frequent disclosure of mutual fund portfolio holdings, some
management firm personnel allegedly were selectively disclosing portfolio information that
was later used to trade against their funds and harm their investors.”); Deborah Brewster, SEC
Hits Out at Mutual Funds’ Credibility Gap, FIN. TIMES (London), May 21, 2004, at 19
(reporting on Paul Roye’s announcement that some firms “were selectively disclosing
portfolio holdings”).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fifteen Firms To Pay over
$21.5 Million in Penalties To Settle SEC and NASD Breakpoints Charges (Feb. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter Press Release, SEC], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-17.htm.
15. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Tom Lauricella & John Hechinger, Former Fred
Alger Official Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at C1 (“But on Sept. 4, Mr. Connelly
allegedly told a subordinate to ‘delete certain e-mails,’ and directed her to instruct three other
Alger people who reported to Mr. Connelly to delete e-mails about the [late] trading.”).
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complicity of several major fund groups in illegal market-timing and
late-trading.16 In the year following that dramatic press conference,
barely a week passed during which the industry escaped accusations of
yet more transgressions.17
Within days of Spitzer’s announcement, a pack of governing
agencies had loosed investigations of their own upon the investment
advisory business.18 Indeed, within just a matter of months, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had issued Wells
notices,19 conducted depositions, and even reached settlements in
several of its investigations.20 The aggregated penalties, fines, and fee
reductions levied against the investment advisers in just two of those
early settlements amounted to almost $1 billion.21 Since then, other
federal regulators and a posse of state agencies have joined the SEC in
conducting investigations into dozens of fund complexes, and the
aggregate amount paid to settle investigations has climbed to many
billions of dollars.22
In addition, the SEC quickly proposed and adopted a litany of
new rules aimed at patching the industry’s ethical leaks. These
regulations call for broader disclosure with respect to pricing
16. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, supra note 1.
17. Until September 2005, the industry publication, Ignites, maintained on its Web
site a “Scandal Timeline,” which in the first year following Spitzer’s press conference, from
September 3, 2003, to September 3, 2004, listed 204 separate entries. E-mail from Chris
Frankie, Managing Editor, Ignites, to Hannah Campbell, Tulane Law Review, in New
Orleans, La. (Jan. 25, 2006) (on file with the Tulane Law Review).
18. See Brooke A. Masters, Mutual Fund Abuses Alleged in Two Cases, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 2003, at E1.
19. After conducting an investigation into alleged wrongdoing, but prior to
recommending that the Commission approve an enforcement action, the staff of the SEC will
(in a Wells notice) typically provide defendants with one final opportunity (through a Wells
submission) to persuade the staff to change its recommendation. The process derives its
popular name from John Wells, the Chair of an Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies
and Practices that published a report in 1972 recommending this procedure. See LOUIS LOSS
& JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1481-84 (5th ed. 2004).
20. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 14.
21. The settlement orders, formalized as SEC releases, set forth the underlying
allegations and any penalties or fines to which investment advisers have agreed. See Alliance
Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2205A, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket 3401 (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/ia-2205a.htm (setting forth a penalty of $250 million, excluding additional
fee reductions and settlements aggregating to $600 million); Mass. Fin. Servs. Co.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Investment Company Act Release No. 26347
(Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (setting forth a
total settlement of $225 million).
22. Hank Ezell, Mutual Fund Cleanup Gets Good Reviews, ATL. J. CONST., Aug. 29,
2004, at 4Q.
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discounts,23 codes of ethics,24 investment company governance,25 and
new compliance programs,26 among almost a score of topics. The selfregulating organizations have also sharpened their pencils, with the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) issuing new corporate governance rules to
their members.27 Congress, too, stoked the legislative machinery,
holding numerous committee hearings on the matter and voting on
bills aimed at addressing the growing list of complaints.28
Of course, the civil bar never long remains ignorant of plumes of
smoke emanating from regulatory investigations; plaintiffs’ attorneys
have commenced an eager hunt for fire of their own. They have
already filed more than one hundred civil law suits—both class actions
and derivative suits—against dozens of investment advisers, funds, and
trustees.29
What has been remarkable about this decline and fall is not so
much its speed but the pedigree of its tragic hero: the mutual fund
industry boasted a largely celebrated history reaching back eighty
years. Ostensibly, the investment management business benefits from
many of the textbook safeguards designed to guarantee the integrity of
any financial industry and to permit optimal contracting amongst all
parties.
First, mutual fund boards boast high percentages of independent
trustees, who are charged with bargaining at arm’s length with
investment advisers on behalf of fund shareholders.30 Second, the
industry comprises more than 8000 different funds, and competition
23. See Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,262, 33,263-65 (June 14, 2004).
24. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2256, Investment Company Act Release No. 26492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,696 (July 9,
2004).
25. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004).
26. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68
Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,715-23 (Dec. 24, 2003).
27. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 1.
28. See Stephen Labaton, House Backs Bill To Overhaul Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2003, at C1 (reporting the U.S. House of Representatives’ vote of 418-2 to approve
legislation “aimed at deterring trading abuses and fund mismanagement, improving the
disclosure of fee information and increasing the independence of fund boards”).
29. See, e.g., Complaint, Hammerslough v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., No. 04-CV-1185
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2004) (a derivative action consolidated as part of the multidistrict litigation
of market timing and related claims involving several fund complexes, such as Alger,
Columbia, Janus, MFS, One Group, Putnam, and Allianz Dresdner).
30. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 8, 27.
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for the 91 million investing shareholders would appear to be robust.31
With scores of investment advisers competing for more than $7 trillion
in assets,32 one would be hard pressed to imagine a more vigorous
marketplace. Third, both investment advisers and investment
companies are heavily regulated by several important federal
regulations, including not only the Securities Act of 193333 (the
Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 193434 (the
Exchange Act) but also the Investment Advisers Act of 194035 (the
Advisers Act), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act),36
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley).37 Furthermore,
the industry is also governed by specific provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code38 (the Code) and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).39 Largely as a consequence of the
stringency of these regulations, the industry is obliged to disclose vast
quantities of information about mutual funds and their advisers. In
annual reports, semi-annual reports, prospectuses, statements of
additional information, certified shareholder reports, and several other
regularly required disclosure documents, advisers must, in extensive
detail, lay bare the fees, performance histories, investment strategies,
and risks of the funds they manage. For any given mutual fund, the
disclosure documents filed with the SEC annually may easily amount
to several hundred pages. Fourth, many of the shareholders in these
funds are not simply passive retirees; they are sophisticated and
powerful governmental pension plans, university endowments, and
frequently other mutual funds, each aggressively pursuing its own
interest with a full-time staff of highly educated and well-informed
managers. Finally, shareholders of mutual funds, like any other

31. See id. at 13, 79-80.
32. See id. at 79.
33. Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2000)).
34. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm).
35. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b21).
36. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a64). The Investment Company Act is often colloquially referred to as either the Company Act
or, with apparent disregard for the fact that the Advisers Act was passed in the same year, the
1940 Act.
37. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West 2005)).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 4982(a)-(f) (2000).
39. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, and 31 U.S.C. (2000)).
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investors, have access to the courts to pursue legal remedies to void
any advisory agreements that are adverse to their pecuniary interests.
With such an arsenal of structural protections, the investment
management industry should have proven largely immune to inept
governance and distortions in optimal contracting amongst its
constituent parties. Then whence, one must ask, came this collapse?
While the soothing effects of a market rebound appear to have
cooled the interest of some investors in seeking an answer to that
question, the amounts of money at stake are simply too significant to
ignore. Settlements and fines in the first year of investigations alone
amounted to many billions of dollars, and those amounts are very
likely to grow significantly through civil litigation.40 Moreover, those
sums could be dwarfed by the billions and even trillions of dollars in
revenues that some analysts believe Social Security reform would
bring to the industry.41 If mutual funds are truly as susceptible to
malfeasance as the broad array of regulatory investigations would
suggest, surely the time to understand those vulnerabilities is now,
prior to the emergence of new irregularities and before the arrival of
substantial inflows of money magnifies the problem.
This Article argues that the industry’s faults can be found in the
idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the
ability of managers to wield substantial power and to use that power to
extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from shareholders.42
The very structure of mutual funds lays them open to such
abuses. The typical mutual fund is a rudimentary legal vessel into
which shareholders contribute money and over which a board of
trustees governs; the fund has no offices, no equipment, and no
employees.43 Instead, all the functions that a fund needs to perform in
order to achieve its basic mission—which is, essentially, to increase the
value of each shareholder’s investment—are performed by third
parties.44 The most important of these service providers is the entity
that manages the fund’s investment portfolio, the investment adviser.
The investment adviser enters into an advisory agreement with
the fund, represented by the fund’s board of trustees, pursuant to which
the adviser agrees to manage the fund’s money in exchange for a fee
40. See Ezell, supra note 22.
41. See Lauricella, supra note 8; Bucci, supra note 8.
42. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18
J. ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004) (describing the structure of mutual funds and the incentives and
conflicts facing managers and brokers).
43. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 2.
44. See id.
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calculated as a percentage of the assets under management. In
essence, the investment adviser serves as the entire management and
all the personnel of the fund. If a fund—that is, its board of trustees—
is unhappy with the investment adviser’s performance, there is but one
contractual recourse: to terminate the advisory agreement. The board
is heavily constrained from hiring or firing particular executives or
portfolio managers who work for the investment adviser because those
individuals report directly only to their own company’s board of
directors.
Termination of an advisory agreement, however, would have a
devastating effect on the fund. To change the investment adviser of a
fund would be to change the very nature of the fund and to nullify an
essential reason many shareholders have invested in the fund: namely,
to obtain the services of a particular investment adviser. When
thousands of shareholders flocked to the Magellan Fund in its
heyday—the period during which it rose 2700% between 1977 and
199045—many of them were not merely hoping to aggregate their
monies with other shareholders; rather, they were specifically seeking
the wisdom of Peter Lynch, the celebrated portfolio manager who had
won superlative returns on shareholder investments. Magellan’s board
might have believed, therefore, that to replace Lynch and Fidelity
Investments with another adviser would have been to convert the fund
into a completely different investment choice. Rather, the board might
conclude that, if shareholders are unhappy with their investment
adviser, they do not need to wait for the fund’s board to provide a
remedy; the shareholders have a remedy of their own at their ready
disposal: they can simply redeem their shares and leave the fund. Of
course, the ability to redeem is useful to shareholders only if they
know when to do so. Many shareholders, however, may not be paying
close attention to whether their adviser is extracting insupportable fees,
either because they are unwilling or unable to monitor the situation or
because they are receiving sufficiently large returns from the fund not
to mind losing out on additional gains. Either way, many shareholders
may not exit a fund even when it may be in their interest to do so. In
any event, the termination of advisory agreements is so rare as to be
practically nonexistent. This limitation severely restricts the ability of

45. See Stephen Schurr, A Little Knowledge Can Often Be a Dangerous Thing, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 2004, at 12 (“I am awestruck by [Lynch’s] genius as a money
manager, as evidenced by the 2,700 per cent return of the Magellan fund from 1977 to
1990.”).
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a fund’s board to control the management of the fund. Investment
advisers are well aware of this limitation.
Typically, the only recourse open to a board is for its members to
make their displeasure known publicly, in an attempt to embarrass an
uncooperative investment adviser or to invite the possibility of SEC
scrutiny of the adviser. Particularly in the current climate of
heightened regulatory oversight, the threat of such action by a board
certainly can restore some balance of power with the investment
adviser. Advisers are therefore not completely free to impose their
unchecked will in the annual negotiations with a fund board.
Accordingly, if an adviser wishes to extract rents without triggering
board outrage, it may have to camouflage its behavior—that is, an
investment adviser may attempt to obtain greater-than-optimal value
from shareholders without being detected.
In the unique structure of investment companies, advisers are
essentially surrogate executives to mutual funds, and advisory
agreements govern their compensation. And, as has been argued in the
study of executive compensation,46 though not before in the mutual
fund context, a substantial degree of managerial power may distort
optimal contracting and permit managers to extract rents. In this
setting, advisers wield a great deal of managerial power and often use
that power to extract value from shareholders beyond what has been
negotiated in the advisory contract. Indeed, this novel application of
the managerial power hypothesis demonstrates that the alleged
transgressions are best understood as camouflaged attempts by
advisers to mine rents from fund shareholders.
II.

THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY INDUSTRY

A. A Brief History of Mutual Funds
The notion of pooling money into a common investment fund is
not a new one. Indeed, European financiers have been investing in
mutual funds or their antecedents for hundreds of years.47 In Britain,
46. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 843-49 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David L. Walker,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751, 785 (2002); cf. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:
Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 857-69
(2002) (arguing that managers extract greater compensation through the undervalued
“perceived cost” of stock option incentives as opposed to managerial power).
47. Dustin Woodard, The History of Mutual Funds, http://mutualfunds.about.com/cs/
history/a/fund_history.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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Parliament authorized the earliest formal authority in the AngloAmerican legal tradition for such vehicles when it passed the Joint
Stock Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867.48 These two laws created the
first opportunity for investors, “to share in the profits of an investment
enterprise” while “limit[ing] investor liability to the amount of
investment capital devoted to the enterprise.”49
Soon thereafter, in 1868, London witnessed the founding of the
Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, which proclaimed its ability
to offer “the investor of moderate means the same advantages as the
large capitalist . . . by spreading the investment over a number of
different stocks.”50 More than fifty years later, on March 21, 1924,
three Boston financiers at last gave America its first mutual fund:
Massachusetts Investors Trust.51 In its inaugural year, the trust grew
from $50,000 to $392,000 in assets.52 Now, eighty years later,
Massachusetts Investors Trust is a $5.3 billion fund.53
Despite the dramatic growth of the first American trust in its
debut year, this novel investment approach was not immediately
celebrated: by the close of 1929, the entire industry amounted to no
more than $140 million.54 The stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing
Great Depression continued to inhibit growth of mutual funds. In the
course of the next decade, however, the passage of a series of
foundational securities laws helped to restore the confidence of
investors: first came the Securities Act in 1933,55 then the Exchange
48. See The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.); The Companies Act,
1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131 (Eng.); see also INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 4 (describing a
brief history of mutual funds).
49. INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 4.
50. Id.
51. See Mass. Investors Trust, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933 (Form N-1A), pt. IV (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/63091/000095015604000074/d604691.txt (“MFS is America’s oldest mutual fund
organization. MFS and its predecessor organizations have a history of money management
dating from the founding of this fund in 1924.”).
52. Woodard, supra note 47.
53. See MFS Investment Management Home Page, www.mfs.com (follow “Products
and Performance” hyperlink; then follow “Mutual Funds” hyperlink; then follow
“Massachusetts Investors Trust” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). Massachusetts
Investors Trust is also centrally involved in the recent industry investigations, having been
named as one of ten funds advised by MFS that the SEC believes were market-timed. See
Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213 (Feb. 5, 2004), Investment
Company Act Release No. 26347, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.
htm.
54. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 5.
55. Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2000)).
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Act in 1934,56 then, in 1940, both the Advisers Act57 and the Investment
Company Act.58
Ten years later, in 1951, the total number of funds exceeded one
hundred, and the number of shareholder accounts exceeded one
million.59 In 1954, the stock market finally rose above its 1929 peak,
and by the end of that decade, the industry comprised 155 mutual
funds with $4.3 million in shareholder accounts.60 Over the next five
decades, the investment advisory industry enjoyed a sustained boom in
the growth of mutual funds, spurred by the advent of index funds,
which allowed investors to replicate in one security the entire breadth
of a market metric (such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the
Standard & Poors 500 Stock Index);61 the emergence of 401(k)
accounts in the 1970s, which encouraged employees to funnel tax-free
savings to a limited buffet of investment options (frequently mutual
funds) selected by their plan administrator;62 and the creation of
56.
57.

Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm).
Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-

58.

Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-

59.
60.
61.

See INV. INST. CO., supra note 3, at inside front cover.

21).
64).
INV. INST. CO., MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, inside front cover (41st ed. 2001).

See JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS: NEW IMPERATIVES FOR

THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 114-17 (1999).

62. One account of the origin of the 401(k) describes it as follows:
In 1974, the first individual retirement accounts . . . were introduced, but the
standards for qualification were strict, and they didn’t really catch on. In the Tax
Reform Act of 1978, legislators loosened things up a bit by allowing workers to
contribute their cash bonuses to retirement savings accounts on a tax-deferred
basis. The wording of this clause, No. 401(k), was vague, and it attracted the
attention of R. Theodore Benna, an employee-benefits consultant in Langhorne,
Pennsylvania.
One Saturday afternoon in 1980, Benna, who was then thirty-nine years old,
was helping one of his clients, a local bank, to redesign its employee pension plan
when he had a thought. If cash bonuses could be sheltered from tax under clause
401(k), why couldn't regular income be sheltered in the same way? There didn’t
appear to be anything in the statute that specifically ruled it out. “My approach
was that if the code doesn’t say, ‘Thou shalt not,’ then thou should be able to” . . . .
He designed a retirement plan that would allow employees to contribute a portion
of their paychecks to a savings account on a pretax basis. A few months later,
Benna’s own firm, the Johnson Companies, launched the first 401(k) plan. In
November, 1981, the Internal Revenue Service gave Benna’s creation its official
blessing. With legal approval, the new savings plans spread rapidly, and by 1985
more than ten million employees had one.
Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on
Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 52 n.151 (2002) (quoting John Cassidy, Striking It Rich,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 14, 2002, at 63, 63-64).
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Individual Retirement Accounts in the 1980s,63 which prompted yet
more personal investing.
Today, there are more than 8000 U.S. mutual funds,64 which hold
an aggregate of more than $7.4 trillion in assets.65 By way of
comparison, the entire value of the outstanding equity of U.S.
companies is $14 trillion.66 Approximately ninety-one million
individuals residing in over fifty-three million households67 (that is,
almost half of all U.S. households) and almost a fifth of all U.S.
household assets68 are invested in mutual funds.

B.

Rationales for Investing in Pooled Vehicles

In just eighty years, mutual funds have thoroughly saturated the
investment landscape, insinuating themselves into the entire spectrum
of American portfolios. What accounts for this broad appeal?
Advocates of mutual funds69 typically point to three principal reasons
for the allure of modern mutual funds to such a broad and deep
segment of the U.S. population: diversification of investments,
professional asset management, and redemption upon demand.70
1.

Diversification of Investments

Financial advisers have long appreciated the salutary effects of
By spreading
diversification upon an investment portfolio.71
investments across a broad range of ventures, an investor can protect
against the risk of any single one of those ventures failing.72 While
such an approach may limit the possibility of fully enjoying the
rewards of any single venture succeeding wildly, over the long term,
63. See Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30: A
Retrospective, PERSPECTIVE (Inv. Co. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2005, at 1 (noting that
“[i]ndividuals had $3.0 trillion in IRAs by the end of 2003”).
64. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), “[a]t the end of 2003,
investors could choose from 8,126 U.S. mutual funds.” INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13.
65. Id. The total amount of assets in mutual funds at the end of 2003, according to
the ICI, was $7.414 trillion. Id.
66. See id. at 59.
67. See id. at 80 (“Household mutual fund owners represented 47.9 percent of all
U.S. households in July 2003, down from 49.6 percent in 2002.”).
68. See id.
69. In this Article, references to the activities of “mutual funds” and “investment
companies” are generally to open-end investment companies and not, unless stated otherwise,
to closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, or unit investment trusts.
70. INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13-19.
71. See id. at 10.
72. See id.
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diversification dampens the effects of outlying highs and lows,
allowing investors to benefit from the seemingly ineluctable longerterm trend toward economic appreciation. Over the past fifty years, all
the established financial benchmarks of the overall U.S. economy—
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, S & P 500 Index, Russell
2000, and Wilshire 5000—have registered a steady increase in value.73
For the lone investor of modest means, however, achieving
diversification without the assistance of mutual funds or similar pooled
investment vehicles might prove impossible. With only a few hundred
dollars to invest, such an individual might be able to purchase single
shares of just a few companies—certainly nothing like the wellbalanced portfolio contemplated by advocates of prudent
diversification. Investors who coordinate their efforts, however, can
use the combined fund of millions or even billions of dollars to build a
highly diversified set of investments, with each investor owning a pro
rata share of the total fund.74 This approach is the fundamental
technique of a mutual fund and is not limited merely to stocks but also
encompasses bonds, foreign securities, derivatives, foreign currencies,
short sales, swaps, shares of other funds, and a panoply of other
investment strategies.75 Thus, one can use funds to diversify ownership
not only of particular issuers or transactions but also of substantially
different investment techniques.
2.

Professional Asset Management

Informal pools, formed by friends and acquaintances, may allow
all participants to discuss and determine their investment decisions by
73. See Dow Jones Averages, http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/?event=show
Averages; Standard and Poors 500 Index Gains and Losses, http://www.efmoody.
com/investments/returns.html; Russell 200 Historical Index, http//www.russell.com/common/
indexes/csvs/russell2000index_hist.csv; Wilshire Total Market (5000) Stock Index,
http://www.neatideas.com/data/data/w5000M.htm.
74. Since the earliest British joint stock companies and before, investors have long
appreciated that the freedom to amalgamate funds creates economies of scale and allows
individual investors to purchase fractions of items that might not otherwise be divisible. See
INV. CO. INST. supra note 3, at 4. A whaling ship, for instance, might have been a lucrative
investment but surely also an expensive one. Having a quarter of the necessary money would
be worth nothing, for a quarter of a boat would bring home nothing. With three likeminded
patrons, however, one could venture to own a quarter of all the oil, baleen, spermaceti, and
ambergris the ship might carry.
75. As just one example, the MFS fund complex offers more than sixty-five funds,
among which are the MFS West Virginia Municipal Bond Fund, the MFS International
Diversification Fund, and the MFS Utilities Fund. See MSF Investment Management,
http://www.mfs.com (follow “Products & Performance” hyperlink; then follow “Mutual
Funds” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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consensus, but that approach would be impossible for a formal mutual
fund. In order for such a complex organism to function effectively, its
shareholders must delegate the full-time business of making
investment decisions to an individual or a team of specialists. In the
case of investment companies, the portfolio managers of a professional
investment adviser research and choose when to buy and sell securities
on behalf of the entire fund. This professional management is
frequently touted as one of the paramount advantages of an actively
managed mutual fund.76
By purchasing shares of a mutual fund and agreeing to pay
administrative fees associated with those shares, investors essentially
hire professional money managers to invest their money. For investors
who have neither the time, the expertise, nor the inclination to manage
their own funds, the attraction of such an approach is considerable.
And with a modicum of research, any shareholder can determine the
track record of a particular investment adviser—or even of an
individual portfolio manager who works for that adviser—with respect
to any of the mutual funds that the adviser or portfolio manager
oversees.77 Of course, as we are constantly reminded, past performance
is no guarantee of future results, but millions of investors nevertheless
express their confidence by investing with money managers who have
established successful track records.
3.

Redemption upon Demand

As important as the decision of which investment to put money
into is the ability to get money out, preferably with profits in tow. The
exit strategy is a serious consideration with any investment, and
investors frequently must pay a premium for the ability to extricate
themselves with the minimum of bother or delay. Liquidity—that is,

76. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 9. An “actively managed” mutual fund is one
in which portfolio managers personally research, select, and monitor the fund’s investments;
this type of fund is far more expensive to operate than, for instance, an index fund, whose
investment decisions are made by a computer algorithm programmed simply to track the
holdings of a market index, such as the S & P 500. Because no ongoing human involvement
is required to manage the latter, such funds typically bear lower advisory fees. See id.
77. Investors can purchase information on specific funds from commercial thirdparty information purveyors, such as Morningstar, http://www.morningstar.com and Lipper,
http://www.lipperweb.com, but can also use free, publicly available sources, such as the
SEC’s Web site, which includes links to all filings made on the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). EDGAR includes all mutual fund prospectuses
and SAIs, which include large quantities of data on each registered fund. See SEC Filings &
Forms, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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the ability to exit from an investment upon relatively short notice—is
influenced by a number of factors.78
Often, issuers of securities will offer an enhanced return in
exchange for an investor’s agreeing to leave his or her money
untouched for longer periods of time. Certificates of deposit and
treasury bills reflect this premium by offering higher interest rates
commensurate with longer term notes. Hedge funds, too, will
frequently reward investors who agree to lock up their funds for years
by charging those investors lower management or performance fees.79
Securities regulations also impose time restrictions upon the resale of
certain securities or, alternatively, condition the resale of securities
upon registration with the SEC, a process that adds not only time but
significant expense. Outside the realm of securities transactions, one
can easily appreciate the illiquidity of certain investments, such as
purchasing a house. If an owner wishes to flip a property as soon as
possible, nothing will guarantee the immediate appearance of a ready
buyer willing to purchase the property for an amount at which the
owner values it.
Mutual funds offer investors a highly liquid investment vehicle by
guaranteeing the redemption of shares upon demand. Subject to a few
limitations,80 mutual funds guarantee their shareholders, on any given
business day, the right to put shares back in the fund and to receive
cash in exchange for them.81 Thus, fund shareholders are never locked
into an investment from which they cannot readily extricate themselves
on short notice.

C.

The Structure of a Mutual Fund Complex

For such a ubiquitous investment option, mutual funds suffer
from a great deal of misunderstanding. Perhaps the most common
misconception reflects a fundamental confusion about the architecture
of mutual funds: many people erroneously conflate the acquisition of
78. Black’s Law Dictionary defines liquidity as the “quality or state of being readily
convertible to cash” or “[t]he characteristic of having enough units in the market that large
transactions can occur without substantial price variations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950
(8th ed. 2004).
79. See Alexander M. Ineichen, Funds of Hedge Funds: Industry Overview, 4 J.
WEALTH MGMT., Mar. 22, 2002, at 47, 47-48; Ron S. Geffner, Deals on the Side, HEDGE
FUND MANAGER, U.S. EAST COAST 2005, at 26-27.
80. For example, many mutual funds charge investors a fee to redeem their shares if
those shares have been held for less than some minimum period. See Mandatory
Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,375A, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762, 11,763-64 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004).
81. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 16.
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shares of a mutual fund with an investment in the equity of an
investment adviser. In fact, mutual funds and their investment advisers
are almost always two entirely separate legal entities. Thus, a purchase
of shares of Fidelity’s Magellan Fund is not a purchase of equity in
Fidelity Investments.82 Indeed, investment advisers are frequently
subsidiaries of large financial conglomerates and therefore closed to
direct public investment.
Mutual funds are unique business
organizations, and that fact accounts for the somewhat curious
structure of the investment management industry.
1.

Investment Companies

At the heart of the industry’s structure lies the mutual fund or, as
it is known more formally, the investment company.83 Investment
companies are rather Spartan business organizations, consisting of
little more than shareholders, cash, fund shares, a portfolio of
investment securities, and trustees. Shareholders contribute cash—
which is then used to acquire a portfolio of investment securities—in
exchange for shares of the investment company, and trustees represent
the interests of those shareholders.84 Typically, a company has no
employees and no physical plant, property, or equipment. Broadly
speaking, the goal of every investment company is to try to increase
the value of each shareholder’s investment. In order to accomplish that
82. The confusion surrounding this topic was at the heart of an issue raised during the
Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. At the time that
he was a member of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Alito, who owned shares
in Vanguard mutual funds, sat on a case in which the investment manager, Vanguard,
appeared as a defendant. During the confirmation hearings, some critics—who mistakenly
assumed that a financial interest in a mutual fund is the same as a financial interest in that
fund’s adviser—contended that Alito should have recused himself from the case. Mutual
funds and their advisers, however, are almost never the same entity.
Vanguard, however, is a rare exception to that rule, inasmuch as Vanguard, the
investment adviser, is wholly owned by the Vanguard funds. Thus, an owner of shares of
Vanguard funds, such as Judge Alito, would in fact indirectly own a portion of Vanguard, the
investment adviser. Several ethics experts, however, argued that the size of Judge Alito’s
ultimate ownership of the defendant in this instance was insignificant. See, generally, Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Democrats Press Court Designee Over Mutual Fund Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2005, at A22.
83. The 1940 Act definition of an “investment company” is lengthy and convoluted
but covers, inter alia, “any issuer which . . . is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily,
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2000).
84. The shares that an investor purchases to participate in the mutual fund are
typically referred to as “fund shares,” whereas the securities in which the fund then invests
using the proceeds from fund shares are known as “portfolio securities” or “underlying
securities.”
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mission, mutual fund trustees enter into contractual arrangements on
behalf of their investment companies with a retinue of third-party
service providers.
The conflation of investment advisers and investment companies
is not entirely accidental. Funds are almost always sponsored by
investment advisers, who file the formation documents, pay the startup costs, register the shares, seed and incubate the fund, and select the
trustees. When provided the opportunity to give a name to a new
investment company on a Secretary of State’s forms, few advisers
forgo the opportunity to incorporate their own name into the title of the
new fund. Hence, there should be no mystery as to the identity of the
adviser of, say, the Putnam Classic Equity Fund85 even though,
technically, that fund could be advised by any investment adviser and
is not an affiliate of Putnam. Having developed a reputation from
years of managing other mutual funds, however, Putnam wants to be
sure future potential investors in the new fund know immediately who
will be acting as its investment adviser.
Perhaps the most common business form chosen for new
investment companies is the Massachusetts business trust. This choice
is explained partly by the industry’s heritage in Boston and partly by
the rather peculiar idiosyncrasies of Massachusetts state law. The
particular chapter of Massachusetts Code that provides for these trusts
contains only fourteen sections86—compared to 222 for corporations.87
This relative dearth of regulation is one of the primary attractions of
Massachusetts business trusts.
Against this less burdensome
regulatory backdrop, founders of trusts are at liberty to devise many of
their own rules for the new organizations and to codify those
preferences in the formation documents: the declaration of trust and
by-laws. These governing principles are legally valid provided they do
not conflict with state or federal securities regulations, though of
course, ultimately, shareholders must be willing to accept them.
Again, Massachusetts state law leaves the canvas largely blank for the
initial shareholders of a trust.88 And, typically, at its inception, a trust’s
shares are owned by only one initial shareholder: the investment
85. See Putnam Equity Fund, Registration Statement (Form N-1A), at 4-6 (Mar. 29,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/930748/000092881604000243/
cef1.txt.
86. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 182, §§ 1-14 (LexisNexis 2005) (entitled “Voluntary
Associations and Certain Trusts”).
87. Id. ch. 156D, §§ 1.01-17.04 (LexisNexis 2005) (entitled “Business Corporations”).
88. See generally id. ch. 182, §§ 1-14.
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adviser. As long as the investment company’s governing principles
comport with state law (which is usually quite lenient) and federal
securities regulation (which is somewhat less so), the investment
adviser can draft them with a free hand, subject to what the market will
bear.89
Once the investment company is formed and its shares registered
with the SEC, the sponsoring investment adviser will typically seed the
fund with at least $100,000 and assign a portfolio manager to manage
the portfolio as though it were a public mutual fund.90 This period of
incubation allows the investment adviser to train portfolio managers
and to assess the efficacy of the fund’s particular investment strategy.
When the adviser is ready, it will open the fund and then market the
fund’s shares to the investing public.
2.

Fund Shareholders

Shareholders typically purchase fund shares from the investment
company itself and, when they are ready to sell, put those shares back
into the company.91 This approach contrasts with the manner in which
shares of public operating companies are traded, where the majority of
investors purchase shares not from the company itself—a transaction
that occurs only in the comparatively rare event of an initial public or
follow-on offering—but from current shareholders of the issuer’s stock
who are willing to sell. Mutual fund shares, by contrast, are not
typically traded among investors on a secondary exchange.92 Instead,
the investment company offers a perpetual stream of its shares to any
investors willing to purchase them; similarly, it must be prepared to
redeem each of the shares it issues.93 Consequently, the registration
statement for a mutual fund does not fix the number or value of shares
89. In recent settlement agreements related to the industry abuses, however, the SEC
has demanded, and several investment advisers have agreed to hold, shareholder meetings on
a regular basis. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Mass. Fin. Servs.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347, 82 SEC pocket 341 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (“Commencing in 2005 and not less than
every fifth calendar year thereafter, each MFS Retail Fund will hold a meeting of
shareholders at which the board of trustees will be elected.”).
90. See id.
91. Investors can make these purchases and sales either directly through the fund’s
distributor or indirectly through retail brokerage houses. Mutual fund prospectuses regularly
contain information on how prospective investors can contact the fund’s distributor by
telephone or the Internet.
92. Compare the shares of registered closed-end funds, which are regularly traded on
stock exchanges.
93. INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 16.
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it wishes to issue but rather allows for the issuance of an infinite
number of shares.94 As long as new investors pay fair value for their
shares and exiting investors receive fair value for theirs, these comings
and goings do not dilute or increase the value of any other shareholder’s investment.
Because mutual fund shares are not traded on an exchange, their
value does not turn on the subjective assessments of other investors in
the marketplace. Instead, the worth of each share is a simple fraction
of the total value of the net assets of the fund.95 Shareholders purchase
fund shares by paying the net asset value (NAV) per share and, in turn,
receive NAV when redeeming fund shares.96 NAV is calculated by
dividing the total value of a fund’s portfolio investments plus any other
assets, minus any liabilities, by the total number of outstanding fund
shares. Funds are required to calculate their NAV daily, and typically
they do so immediately after the close of business at 4:00 p.m. Eastern
time.97
To illustrate, if a fund possessed cash in the amount of $11
million and securities valued at $74 million, owed liabilities of $4
million, and had 5 million outstanding shares, its NAV would be:
Cash plus other assets minus liabilities
$11 million + $74 million - $4 million Fund Share Price or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– = Net Asset Value
5,000,000
$16.20
So with any appreciation or decline in the value of securities in a
fund’s portfolio, the value of the shares of that fund will rise or fall
accordingly.

94. See id. at 16-17.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Rule 22c-1 of the 1940 Act sets forth the requirements for the daily pricing of
mutual fund shares. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2005); see also Amendments to Rules
Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68
Fed. Reg. 70,388, 70,388 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (proposing to amend current rules to the
effect that an order to redeem or purchase fund shares would receive the current day’s price
only if the order is received by the time the fund established for calculating its NAV).
Violating the 4:00 p.m. deadline allows late traders to reap benefits at the expense of existing
fund shareholders, whose gains are thereby diluted. See Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading

at Stale Prices with Modern Technology: Policy Options for Mutual Funds in the Internet
Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 16-20 (2002), http://www.vjolt.net/vol7/issue3/v7i3_a06Ciccotello.pdf.

1422
3.

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1401

The Board of Trustees

Representing the interests of the fund’s shareholders is the board
of trustees. In a fund’s earliest stages, the investment adviser, as the
fund’s only shareholder, is in a position to appoint the trustees. This
power of appointment is not entirely unconstrained, as federal
securities laws require that a majority of the members of the board be
independent—that is, persons who are not affiliated with the
investment adviser.98 In the aftermath of the industry’s recent
upheavals, the SEC has passed new rules that allow advisers to take
advantage of regulatory exemptions that have become critical to the
running of a mutual fund only if the fund’s board increases its
percentage of independent trustees to seventy-five percent of the
board.99
Another quirk of the mutual fund industry that has no analog in
the world of operating companies is that a single board of trustees may
be responsible for the shareholders of many different funds.
Investment advisers frequently manage the assets of multiple funds.
Indeed, in some of the nation’s larger fund complexes, a single adviser
manages more than one hundred funds.100 To be a shareholder in one
fund does not necessarily mean that one is a shareholder in any other
fund in a mutual fund complex; the only way to be a shareholder in
each of those funds is to purchase shares in each particular fund. As a
practical matter, then, the populations of shareholders in separate funds
sometimes overlap and sometimes remain entirely distinct.
Shareholder distribution is simply a function of the investment choices
individual shareholders make. The same is not the case for the board
of trustees. Frequently, a single board of trustees serves all of the
funds managed by a single adviser. For the investment adviser, who
wields the greatest degree of control in choosing the trustees,
interacting with a single board affords great practical convenience. For
their services, board members are typically paid for participation in

98. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000)
(prohibiting an investment advisor from serving a mutual fund except pursuant to a contract
that has been approved by a majority of trustees who are independent).
99. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004).
100. MFS, for instance, oversees a family of 71 funds, and Fidelity manages more than
200 funds. See MFS Investment Management, http://www.mfs.com (last visited Feb. 14,
2006); Fidelity Investments, http://www.fidelity.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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board and committee meetings, and those costs are spread across all
the funds in the complex represented by that board.101
The primary service that a board of trustees provides for the
shareholders of a fund is overseeing the contractual arrangements
between the funds governed by the board and the third parties that
provide services to those funds.102 Specifically, a board will regularly
monitor the performance of the service providers, meet annually to
review their mutual funds’ contracts, and then negotiate to renew
contracts with the service providers.103
4.

Service Providers to the Funds

As with practically all serious business enterprises, mutual funds
hire external contractors to perform specialized tasks on their behalf.
These service providers include the usual suspects, such as law firms
and accounting firms and, when times are trying, public relations
agencies. Mutual funds also retain the services of a specialized group
of four entities that perform the operations unique to the investment
advisory business: the investment adviser, the distributor, the transfer
agent, and the custodian.104
a.

The Investment Adviser

The single most important service provider to a mutual fund is
the company that serves as its investment adviser. Indeed, as has been
discussed,105 funds almost always owe their very existence to
investment advisers, which create the funds and shepherd them
through their formation and incubation. Then, once a fund is fully
operational, the adviser’s portfolio managers continue to make the
critical investment decisions that determine whether shareholders
realize a profit or loss on their fund shares. In addition, advisers
provide most of the personnel and administrative support the fund
needs to conduct its business, from paying the fund’s bills, to
compiling board materials and data that trustees need for their
deliberations, to drafting regulatory filings in compliance with federal

101. See Bonnie Bauman, ‘More Time, More Money’ for Directors in 2004,
BOARDIQ, May 3, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print/20050503/more_time_more_
money_directors (subscription required).
102. INV. CO. INST. supra note 3, at 7-8.
103. See id. at 8-9.
104. See id. at 7 (but referring to a “distributor” as a “principal underwriter”).
105. See supra text accompanying note 91.

1424

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1401

securities laws.106 In essence, advisers provide life support to otherwise
inert funds.
At the core of the adviser’s team of employees is a staff of senior
portfolio managers, who are the professional money managers charged
with investing the millions and sometimes billions of dollars pooled in
the funds.107 At times, one portfolio manager will take ultimate
responsibility for each fund; at others, a team of managers takes joint
responsibility for the investment decisions. Regardless of the strategy,
portfolio managers are the stars of investment advisers, and are
compensated accordingly.
The advisory agreements pursuant to which advisers provide
their services to mutual funds and mutual funds pay those advisers are
limited by law to one-year terms.108 Each year, then, the trustees must
decide whether to renew a fund’s contract with its adviser.109 Although
boards almost always renew these agreements, trustees must still
undertake a process to review important contractual terms.110 One of
the key provisions of every advisory agreement is the fee that the
adviser will receive for rendering its services to the fund. Federal
regulations severely constrict the ability of advisers of mutual funds to
earn compensation based on the performance of the funds they
manage for fear of providing advisers with too strong an incentive to
pursue aggressive investment strategies with the investments of
shareholders insufficiently sophisticated to appreciate the risks.111
Unlike hedge fund managers or venture capital firms, therefore, a
mutual fund investment adviser does not receive a sizeable percentage
of profits earned. Instead, the adviser receives an advisory fee
computed as a percentage of assets under management.112 Typically,
advisory fees range from 20 to 200 basis points,113 depending on
whether the fund is actively managed by investment personnel or
governed by an automatic, computer-driven investment program, as
106. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 8-10.
107. See Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,533, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,788,
52,788-89 (Aug. 27, 2004).
108. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), (c)
(2000).
109. Id.
110. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c).
111. See id. § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1). However, Rule 205-3 of the
Advisor’s Act permits performance fees only if the investment advisor is entering into an
agreement with a “qualified client.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2005).
112. See Mahoney, supra note 42, at 167.
113. A basis point is equal to 0.01%.
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well as on the complexity of the securities in which the fund invests.114
So, for a fund with average daily net assets of $2 billion, an adviser
that charged 75 basis points would receive $15 million per year.
This payment structure reduces an adviser’s revenues to the
product of a single multiplicand (the assets under management) and a
single multiplier (the advisory fee). In order to increase those
revenues, therefore, the adviser has but two choices: increase the
advisory fees or increase the assets under management. Fee increases,
however, often require the consent of fund shareholders,115 the
acquisition of which involves both practical and political difficulties,
and are capped by what the market will bear. Consequently, fee
increases are constrained by practical, political, and economic forces
and are, therefore, relatively uncommon.
Accordingly, the more common approach is to increase the assets
under management, which an adviser can do also in one of two ways:
by making wise investment decisions that increase the returns on a
fund’s underlying portfolio securities or by persuading new and
existing shareholders to invest more money in the fund.116 As long as
the assets rise, either approach is equally effective mathematically.
One could conceive of a fund closed to additional investment that
nonetheless generates more and more revenue for the adviser simply
on the strength of successful investment decisions. On the other hand,
one could also conceive of an investment adviser increasing its annual
revenues without making any profitable investment decisions and,
instead, simply recruiting new shareholders to the fund.
Although either scenario holds the potential for equivalent results
for the adviser, the two lead to decidedly different consequences for
shareholders: growth in a fund achieved solely by increasing
investments in the fund is not shared by shareholders. For the
shareholders in such a situation, the value of the fund’s shares that they
hold remains stagnant or may even drop. Theoretically, if a fund
increases in size only through new investments, its shareholders may
enjoy increased economies of scale but only to the extent that the
adviser passes those savings back to shareholders, which is by no
114. Brian K. Reid & John D. Rea, Mutual Fund Distribution Channels and
Distribution Costs, PERSPECTIVES (Inv. Co. Inst., Wash. D.C.), July 2003, at 15 & fig. 11.
115. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
116. When new and existing shareholders make additional investments in a fund, they
do not—in most circumstances—dilute the holdings of existing shareholders because they
pay for the new shares they receive with new money. Investments by market timers and late
traders, however, are likely to dilute returns by existing shareholders. See Ciccotello et al.,
supra note 97, ¶¶ 16-20.
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means certain. Appreciating the divergence in the adviser’s interest
and the shareholder’s interest is critical to understanding the crux of
the recent allegations leveled against the advisers.117
b.

The Principal Underwriter or Distributor

Outside the investment management industry, when a typical
operating company goes public, it will retain an underwriter or
syndicate of underwriters to buy its shares first and then to distribute
those shares to the wider public.118 The same principle holds true with
mutual funds: investment companies hire a principal underwriter,
more commonly known as a distributor, to purchase its shares first and
then to distribute them to the wider public.119 Because mutual funds
are in a sense perpetually going public, however, their relationships
with distributors last well beyond just the initial formation of the
companies. Indeed, as long as a mutual fund is open to investment, it
relies upon a distributor to purchase and to distribute its shares. And,
as with the ongoing relationship with the investment adviser, the fund’s
board of trustees must approve the contractual agreement between the
fund and the distributor.120
Distributors distribute fund shares through two primary
marketing channels: one directly to potential fund shareholders, the
other via collaborations with retail brokerage houses. An investor can
therefore purchase fund shares either by contacting the distributor
directly, typically through a web site or toll-free number listed in the
fund’s prospectus, or by executing a trade though the investor’s broker
such as Charles Schwab, Morgan Stanley, or E*Trade. To market to
these two channels, distributors will purchase advertisements on
television, radio, and other media, and will attempt to persuade
brokers/dealers of the value of their funds’ shares.
For these efforts, distributors are compensated by payments out
of the fund’s assets. As a general rule, federal regulations significantly
restrict the use of fund assets, but an express exception—Rule 12b-1 of
the 1940 Act—provides for the shareholders’ funds to be used for the
distribution of fund shares by, typically, paying a distributor.121 The
rationale behind this exception is the notion that existing fund
117. See generally Mahoney, supra note 42 (examining costs incurred by mutual fund
shareholders as a result of agency problem).
118. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 73-91.
119. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 10.
120. See id.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005).
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shareholders may benefit when a fund attracts additional shareholders
because larger funds with more assets are capable of enjoying
economies of scale that are shared by all shareholders.122 Thus,
shareholders are assessed distribution fees, more commonly called
12b-1 fees, to finance the distributor’s efforts in selling more shares of
the fund.
These 12b-1 fees are calculated in much the same way as
advisory fees: the distributor is paid a certain number of basis points
on the fund’s assets under management.123 If, for instance, the 12b-1
fee for a $500 million fund is 25 basis points, the distributor would
receive $1.25 million per year. And, as do investment advisers,
distributors therefore have a strong financial incentive to increase the
assets of the funds for which they work. Unlike investment advisers,
however, distributors are not involved in investment decisions and
therefore cannot increase the fund’s assets through prudent money
management. All a distributor can do to increase its own revenue is to
increase the inflow of new investments to the fund.
c.

The Transfer Agent

As is the case with any public company, the maintenance of
accurate records of who owns what shares in an investment company
is a vital back-office function. Funds typically hire a transfer agent to
provide this service and to take care of the concomitant tasks of
calculating interest and disbursing capital gains and interest for fund
shareholders.124 Transfer agents are usually also responsible for
mailing account statements, tax materials, and prospectuses and other
required disclosure documents to fund shareholders.125 A board of
trustees will typically approve an administrative services agreement
that governs the relationship of a fund and its transfer agent.

122. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380 (Aug. 2, 2004). Whether shareholders do, in fact, share
in these economies of scale is uncertain. Certainly, when advisers fail to pass the savings
back to shareholders, as is discussed in the breakpoint section below, investors realize no such
savings. Some commentators have questioned whether shareholders receive these savings
even in the absence of malfeasance. See, e.g., John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual
Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 619-27 (2001)
(suggesting that the breakpoints do not capture the economies of scale).
123. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 164-65.
124. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 11.
125. See id.
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The Custodian

The most important asset of an investment company is its
portfolio of underlying securities and investments. By law, investment
companies are required to protect those securities by entrusting them
to a custodian.126 Custodians are typically large banks that are
accustomed to complying with the extensive regulatory regime that
governs the protection of investments.127 For example, the SEC
requires that the custodian segregate mutual fund portfolio securities
from any other assets held by the custodian.128
As we have seen, in order to carry on the business of a mutual
fund, investment companies must contract with these four important
service providers: the investment adviser, the distributor, the transfer
agent, and the custodian.129 If this nexus of contractual relationships
appears convoluted and sprawling, it may simplify things to bear in
mind that frequently all these third parties are affiliates of one another.
For instance, the Dreyfus Premier Growth and Income Fund retains
Dreyfus Corporation as its investment adviser, Dreyfus Service
Corporation as its distributor, Dreyfus Transfer, Inc., as its transfer
agent, and Mellon Bank, N.A., as its custodian.130 Each of those
entities is a subsidiary of a single global financial services company,
Mellon Financial Corporation.131 In the final analysis, then, the fund
has retained just one variegated entity to provide it with all the
apparatus it needs to operate as a mutual fund.132 Or, more accurately,
one sprawling financial services company has created a mutual fund to
buy its broad array of professional wares.

126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692, 56,693 (Oct. 1, 2003).
129. As with a typical operating company, mutual funds will also retain the services of
law firms, accounting firms, and, if need be, public relations firms. Mutual funds often also
retain the services of research providers, such as Lipper, to provide performance ratings for
their funds, as well as pricing services that specialize in fairly valuing stocks for which no
accurate market quotations are available.
130. See Prospectus, Dreyfus Premier Growth and Income Fund, Feb. 1, 2005, at 6-7,
available
at
http://www.dreyfus.com/content/dr/control?Content=/docs/mfc/dreyfusfunds/factsheet.jsp&fundcode=0320# (follow “Prospectus” link) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
131. See id.
132. See id.
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III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY
RELATIONSHIP

A. Applying an Executive Compensation Paradigm
To understand how the investment management business works,
one must understand not only its constituent parts but how those
components interact. As has been suggested, no more important
relationship exists for a mutual fund than that of the fund with its
investment adviser.133 The adviser provides the experience, expertise,
strategy, and investment acumen that determines whether a fund
succeeds or fails, and the adviser’s employees serve as surrogate
personnel for the fund. Indeed, the adviser is so integrally entwined
with the fund and its operations that separating the two is hard to
conceive and almost impossible, in reality, to do.
Yet this intertwined arrangement is also highly unusual in the
business world. Typically, a corporation retains its own executives,
who in turn hire and oversee the remaining layers of management and
staff needed to carry on the enterprise.134 Of course, operating
companies routinely engage consultants, contractors, and other thirdparty service providers to perform discrete tasks, but only to
supplement, not to replace utterly, the firm’s employees. Though these
differences are notable and render mutual funds a species of their own,
one can nevertheless turn to a well-studied body of corporate law—
and its attendant exegetic theories—to understand the dynamic
between a mutual fund and its adviser.
The study of executive compensation is the examination of how
corporations resolve the oldest quandary of corporate law: the
principal-agent problem.135 Any business organization owned by one
constituency but managed by another is susceptible to a divergence in
the interests of these principals and agents.136 In conventional
operating companies, this agency problem frequently manifests itself
in the guise of executives who attempt to maximize their own wealth
without regard for, or even to the detriment of, the interests of
shareholders.137 The primary tool used to harmonize the interests of
these two groups is the employment contract that governs executive
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-116.
134. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW ¶¶ 6.1-6.3 (1986).
135. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 122.
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compensation. On behalf of shareholders, an operating company’s
board of directors will attempt to negotiate with each executive a
contract that creates the optimal blend of incentives needed to induce
the executive to pursue interests of the shareholders without depleting
any more shareholder value than is absolutely necessary.138
The board’s goal in these negotiations is not necessarily to obtain
the best management money can buy, but the optimal management. To
be assured of the very best possible management, a board might have
to spend far more money than an executive’s service is worth in order
to obtain a level of expertise that is far more than the enterprise
requires. Then, to monitor the executive’s behavior to confirm that it
aligns with the owners’ interests, a board must expend additional
resources. At a certain point, the costs of such management and
oversight will outweigh the value of any benefits realized by the
shareholders. One does not need Jack Welch to run a lemonade stand.
The goal of executive compensation is to create an optimal agreement
that best balances the management’s compensation and incentives, the
shareholders’ interests, and the costs of reaching and policing such an
agreement.139
The same principles operate in the investment advisory context,
albeit on a different scale. To retain the services of management, the
board negotiates not with specific executives but with the investment
adviser as a single entity. In effect, the board hires in one transaction
all the executives that the fund will need to manage its operations. The
advisory agreement upon which the board and the adviser agree
governs the compensation that the adviser will receive in exchange for
providing management of the fund’s assets. The adviser, in turn, will
use that advisory fee to pay the salaries of each of its portfolio
managers, executives, and other employees. As with individual
executive compensation arrangements, the advisory agreement
contains—with greater and lesser degrees of success—the ingredients
that will determine whether the adviser’s interests are aligned with
those of the fund’s shareholders. The discussion between a mutual
fund board and the collective personnel of an investment adviser is, in
essence, just one example of executive compensation negotiations.
Instead of one executive bargaining with the board, a multitude of
executives working together in a single business entity are negotiating
as the collective executive. Thus, an extension of the theories of
138. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 753-54.
139. See id. at 761-62.
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executive compensation into the investment advisory setting is a
compelling new way to examine the board-adviser dynamic.

B.

The Optimal Contracting Approach

Prior to its recent outbreak of infamy, the mutual fund industry
was considered by many commentators to be a paragon of corporate
governance.140 Writers such as these pointed to bulwarks that should,
in theory, protect the interests of shareholders, such as arm’s-length
bargaining between the board of trustees and the investment adviser,
robust competition in the mutual fund marketplace, a garrulous
disclosure regimen that distributes information about funds and their
management to the public, and highly sophisticated shareholders who
fully understand the business.141 Many of these same elements are also
features of a theoretical framework commonly used to study executive
compensation: the optimal contracting approach.
This approach posits that optimal principal-agent contracts can be
achieved when the following circumstances are present: (1) the board
and the executive conduct their negotiation at arm’s length, (2) market
forces induce the parties to reach optimal bargains, and
(3) shareholders can invoke principles of corporate law to reject
compensation packages that are detrimental to their interests.142 A
confluence of these three conditions, the theory posits, should produce
optimal executive compensation contracts.143 To the casual observer of
the investment advisory industry, these three elements might appear to
be happily congregated already. But the infamies of the past two and a
half years demonstrate the existence of profound flaws in the industry,
which strongly suggest that the optimal contracting perspective is
incomplete. Before examining what the theory lacks, though, let us
first consider what it contains.

140. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 4, at 1, 11.
141. See id.
142. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 540, 548-64 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1262-65 (1982); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 959, 973-74 (1980). The optimal contracting approach posits that optimal
principal-agent contracts can be achieved when a board focuses on three components:
(1) securing and maintaining the services of excellent executives, (2) furnishing those
executives with incentives to expend their energy and to make decisions that redound to the
benefit of shareholders, and (3) keeping the overall costs of such an engagement as low as
possible. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 762.
143. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 762.
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Arm’s-Length Bargaining

The optimal contracting approach requires that the two parties
engaged in the negotiation of a compensatory arrangement be
independent of one another.144 In addition, the theory posits that, from
a position of autonomy, a board will conduct negotiations regarding the
compensation with an eye toward only the maximization of
shareholder value.145 In the mutual fund context, this approach would
involve the fund board negotiating with the investment adviser to
consummate an optimal investment advisory agreement. The
investment advisory industry boasts of policies designed to ensure the
independence of the board in these bargaining sessions.
The negotiation of advisory agreements is typically conducted
between senior representatives of the investment adviser and the
board’s contracts review committee, comprising members of the board
charged with reviewing each fund’s principal third-party agreements.
Federal regulations require that this committee consist only of
independent trustees of the board; that is, only those trustees who are
not affiliated with the investment adviser.146 Typically, the chief
executive officer and other senior executives of the investment adviser
will (subject to the requirement that a certain percentage of the board
be independent) serve on a fund’s board of trustees. These “interested”
trustees cannot take part in the negotiation of the advisory agreement.
To approve a contract between the fund and the investment adviser, a
majority of the independent trustees must vote to do so.147
Frequently, the members of the contracts review committee will
meet by themselves with their own legal counsel in executive session
to deliberate upon the performance of the investment adviser and the
funds under the adviser’s management. This process may take place
over several months as the trustees review the investment returns of
each of the funds and meet with representatives from the investment
adviser to discuss strategic approaches under any renewed contract.
The trustees will frequently review reports prepared by entities such as
Lipper, which set forth how the funds’ performance rated when
compared to other funds of a similar size and with a common
investment objective. From these reports, the trustees can determine

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 764.
See id.
See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000).
See id.

2006]

THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY

1433

whether the adviser has managed any given fund better or worse than
the industry average.
Assisting the independent trustees in this process may be
attorneys who represent the funds as well as attorneys who represent
only the independent trustees.148 And, as is the case in the world of
operating companies, the decision whether to rehire an investment
advisor and how much to pay it are matters of judgment, protected by
the business judgment rule.149 The combination of these elements
might suggest that the advisory agreement is, indeed, negotiated at
arm’s length.
2.

Market Forces

In addition to the prophylactic benefits of arm’s-length
negotiation, the optimal contracting approach theory also suggests that
market forces will compel advisers to seek an optimal, not an
excessive, level of compensation in their advisory agreements. The
competitive landscape of the investment management industry
certainly appears to contain a multitude of adroit advisers, all eager to
provide their services to mutual funds and to reap the rewards of
advisory fees. This robust marketplace also sustains a related industry
of entities that specialize in monitoring and rating advisers and their
funds, such as Lipper150 and Morningstar,151 which in turn propagates a
great deal of information about the various advisers. In addition, the
shareholders of many funds are themselves highly sophisticated
financial outfits capable of monitoring the reasonableness of the
investment advisory agreements.
a.

Competition Amongst Investment Advisers

In many ways, the investment management industry appears to be
one of the more robust marketplaces in the U.S. economy. Hundreds
of investment advisers manage thousands of mutual funds and vie to

148. Retaining “independent counsel,” as that term is defined in the rules to the 1940
Act, is a prerequisite for trustees if they want their funds to be able to rely upon any of a
series of exemptive rules that are extremely important to the running of an investment
company. For Rule 0-1(a)(7)(iii) of the 1940 Act, see 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)-(7)(iii)
(2005).
149. See, e.g., Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d 137, 144 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1975).
150. See Lipper Home Page, http://www.lipperweb.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
151. See Morningstar Home Page, http://www.morningstar.com (last visited Feb. 15,
2006).

1434

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1401

oversee trillions of dollars.152 On the demand side, almost one hundred
million Americans participate in this investment emporium.153 One
could easily assume that the intensity of this competition should bring
all the invisible genius of Adam Smith to bear on the dynamics of the
investment advisory agreement.154
When it comes to selecting a fund in which to invest,
shareholders have an almost paralyzing array of choices. With more
than 600 mutual fund complexes offering more than 8000 funds, the
market offers almost every conceivable type of fund to all manner of
investors.155 Moreover, the market offers many funds of the exact same
type—for instance, numerous S & P 500 Index mutual funds exist, all
of which offer the exact same investment (save for any disparities in
fees charged by the adviser).156 Surely, then, advisers should be acutely
sensitive to the competition they face. The first step they must take to
harvest any revenues is to negotiate successfully with the board of a
fund over an advisory agreement. Should the adviser demand too high
an advisory fee, it may be unsuccessful in persuading the board to
agree, and without the advisory agreement, the adviser receives
nothing.
After the initial execution of an advisory agreement, the market
would appear to compel the adviser to continue performing to the best
of its ability. Advisory agreements generally last for only one year at a
time,157 so advisors work on a short leash and therefore a board may, if
it chooses, quickly terminate an adviser for doing a poor job.
Many advisers develop mutual fund complexes in which they
advise multiple funds.158 The marginal costs of creating and advising a
new fund are low once the adviser has already established its portfolio
management and distribution operations. Managing more funds
allows advisers to attract more shareholders interested in a broader
array of financial products. Thus, the adviser must continue to offer

152. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 70-78.
153. See id. at 79.
154. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 225 (Random House 1985) (1776).
155. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13.
156. See, e.g., The Motley Fool, No-Load Index Funds, http://www.fool.com/
mutualfunds/indexfunds/table01.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (listing 17 no-load S & P
500 index funds).
157. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2)
(2000).
158. See supra text accompanying note 100 (describing examples of extremely large
fund complexes).

2006]

THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY

1435

low advisory fees coupled with high performance in order to induce
the board of trustees to approve the launch of new funds by the adviser.
Even more than in the case of compensation for operating
company executives, the costs of hiring an adviser are passed directly
on to the end customers. When they shop for mutual fund shares,
potential investors can read tables included in fund prospectuses that
set forth data describing the fees they will pay.159 Thus, when
negotiating an advisory contract, advisers must offer an advisory fee
that is acceptable not only to the board but also to potential
shareholders. If an adviser demands too high an advisory fee in
negotiations with the board, then even if it were to persuade the board
to accede to the fee, the marketplace might still reject the fund.
Shareholders might simply not purchase the shares, and the fund
would struggle to accumulate assets to be managed. Thus, perhaps to
an even greater extent than the compensation of individual executives,
advisory fees appear to be determined by what the market will bear.
In addition, the consequences of dismissal by a board’s
termination of an advisory agreement would be profound for an
adviser. Not only would the adviser immediately lose all revenues
from the assets of the fund in question, but the decision would send a
dramatic signal to the market, warning shareholders in other funds of
serious problems with the investment adviser. Moreover, in the context
of a complex of mutual funds, if a board were sufficiently dissatisfied
with an adviser to evict it from one fund, it might easily do so for any
of the other funds in the complex. Thus, the market would appear not
only to compel an adviser to propose a reasonable advisory fee when
seeking a contract but, when operating under that contract, to perform
to its utmost.
b.

Dissemination of Information

As the supply and demand for mutual funds has grown, so too
has the concomitant market for information about those funds. As part
of their marketing efforts, many funds announce the performance of
their funds in advertisements directed to the investing public.
159. The registration statement under the 1940 Act for open-end mutual funds, set
forth on Form N-1A, requires that investment companies include information relating to a
description of the fund and its investments and risks (in Item 11 of Form N-1A); the
management of the fund (Item 12); the portfolio managers (Item 15); purchase, redemption,
and pricing of shares (Item 18); taxation of the fund (Item 19); underwriters (Item 20); the
calculation of performance data (Item 21); financial statements (Item 22); and a variety of
other topics. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Registration Statement (Form N-1A),
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf.
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Individual investors can themselves readily find detailed research on
funds through their broker/dealers or from entities that specialize
entirely in gathering and reporting information on funds, such as
Lipper and Morningstar.160 Boards of trustees, also, can and often do
commission detailed reports on the performance of the funds under
their care as part of the process of deciding whether to renew advisory
agreements.161
During the lengthy contract renewal process, trustees often focus
on how well the investment adviser—and the funds the adviser is
managing—are performing. Frequently, the adviser itself will produce
reports setting forth this information.162 Trustees, however, can also
solicit more independent, third-party research customized to their fund
complex. A report by Lipper, for instance, might set forth such
information as the total assets of each fund as of a certain date; the
total one-year, three-year, five-year, and ten-year returns for the fund;
and the expenses being charged by the adviser and the distributor as a
percentage of the fund’s average net assets. Perhaps more importantly,
these reports also provide comparisons to competitors, setting forth the
quintile or decile in which the performance or fees rank as compared
to all funds that use a similar investment approach. From these
reports, trustees can determine whether an adviser is performing better
or worse—and how much so—than the industry average. Similarly,
the reports will inform the board whether the shareholders whom it
represents are being charged fees in line with industry norms.163
Moreover, to the extent that inherent market forces do not
produce information enough for shareholders and trustees, federal
regulations do. One of the constant tasks that every investment adviser
faces is satisfying the enormous disclosure requirements of the 1940
Act and the Advisers Act.164 For the benefit of current and future
shareholders, each fund that an adviser manages must maintain a
prospectus that sets forth a great deal of fund data and a Statement of
160. See Lipper Home Page, supra note 150; Morningstar Home Page, supra note 151.
161. See, e.g., Beagan Wilcox, How Boards Ensure They’re Still Focused on
Performance, BOARDIQ, May 17, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/home/members/article_
search_results.html?id=974211885 (subscription required).
162. See id.
163. For example, Lipper provides a suite of advisory contract renewal services geared
towards allowing fund trustees to satisfy their requirements under Section 15(c) of the 1940
Act. See Lipper Fund Fact Sheets, Advisory Contract Renewal Services-15(c), http://www.
lipperweb.com/products/contract_renewal.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
164. See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing just some of the
disclosure required by Form N-1A).
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Additional Information (SAI) that sets forth an avalanche.165 In these
documents, as well as in annual reports, semiannual reports, certified
shareholder reports, and several other regularly required disclosure
documents, advisers must, in extensive detail, lay bare the fees,166
performance histories,167 investment strategies,168 and risks of the funds
they manage.169 A mutual fund will regularly file several hundreds of
pages with the SEC each year.170 For the purposes of negotiating an
advisory agreement, then, mutual fund boards have no reason not to
consult all the data they need to make a fully informed negotiation.
c.

Protection from Sophisticated Shareholders

Despite the deep and widespread ownership of mutual fund
shares by the American public,171 by no means are all investors simply
future retirees. Many fund shareholders are sophisticated and
financially influential entities, with millions and even billions of
dollars at their disposal to invest.172 Government pension plans,
university endowments, and even other mutual funds regularly
purchase shares in investment companies.173 With them, they bring a
professional staff of highly knowledgeable financial experts, adroit at
determining whether an advisory contract for a particular fund is or is
not well calibrated to advance their interests. Their decision not to
purchase shares in a fund or to leave it in response to an ill-conceived
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing disclosure requirements
set forth in Form N-1A); see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Information Available to
Investment Company Shareholders, Statement of Additional Information, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/mfinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (describing disclosure requirements of
the SA1).
166. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Registration Statement (Form N-1A), http://www.
sec.gov/about/forms/formn_1a.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. For a sense of the filing requirements, visit EDGAR Company Search,
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (enter
the name of any mutual fund registrant).
171. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 79-83.
172. The identities of these large shareholders are set forth in the public filings of
mutual funds. Item 13 of Form N-1A requires that mutual funds disclose principal holders of
their securities, so each fund’s SAI will include a list of major shareholders, many of which
are institutional investors. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Registration Statement (Form N1A), Item 13, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn_1a.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
Item 13(b) states: “State the name, address, and percentage of ownership of each person who
owns of record or is known by the Fund to own beneficially 5% or more of any Class of the
Fund’s outstanding equity securities.” Id.
173. In the investment management industry, these funds of funds are frequently called
“asset allocation” funds.
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advisory agreement would serve as a signal to more passive investors
of the lack of an optimal arrangement. The presence of these erudite
watchdogs adds yet another protective market force that should drive
the terms of an advisory contract toward an optimal equilibrium.
3.

Corporate Law Remedies

A third component that works to produce optimal contracts,
according to proponents of the hypothesis, is the body of corporate law
that allows shareholders to pursue judicial means to challenge advisory
contracts that they believe are less than optimal.174 Specifically,
shareholders have the option of bringing a lawsuit—most likely a
derivative action—to challenge an advisory agreement that they
believe pays the investment adviser too much.175 Such an action might
allege that the board has committed waste or breached its duties of
loyalty or care. If successful, this avenue of recourse would
necessarily impose a substantial influence on the development of
optimal contracts, not only by bringing to bear the force of judicial fiat
on the advisory fees but also by creating an environment in which
boards and investment advisers must bargain in the shadow of such
direct legal remedies.
At a superficial glance, the criteria proposed by the optimal
contracting theory might appear to suggest that the investment
advisory business is a healthy one—and, indeed, commentators only
recently argued that the industry’s governance was “a model for
corporate America.”176 But the even more recent proliferation of
widespread malfeasance is a strong hint that all is not optimal. The
inquiry, then, must turn to the shortcomings of the optimal contracting
theory and to possible alternatives.
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In rejecting the optimal contracting approach, a trio of
commentators has protested that managers wield so much influence
over their own pay arrangements that the theory’s three requisite

174. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 779-80 (discussing the efficacy
of derivative litigation).
175. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 573-80 (2001).
176. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 4, at 1.

2006]

THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY

1439

conditions rarely, if ever, coexist.177 Moreover, any analysis of
executive compensation that fails to appreciate the true extent of
managerial power is necessarily incomplete. In advancing this
managerial power hypothesis, Lucian Bebchuck, Jesse Fried, and
David Walker begin by pointing out the limitations in fact upon arm’slength negotiations, market forces, and legal redress.178 Although their
analysis focuses on operating companies, similar limitations also
plague the interactions of boards and advisers in the mutual fund
context.

A. Limitations of the Optimal Contracting Approach
The same three components of the optimal contract approach that
apparently function so well are actually afflicted by serious limitations,
some of which are unique to the investment advisory context and some
of which maintain in the operating company setting as well.
1.

Arm’s-Length Bargaining

To enjoy any distance from the investment adviser, whether it is
an inch or the length of an arm, a board must truly have an
independent character. In the days when every member of the board
worked for (or had some other direct affiliation with) the adviser, any
negotiation between the two was far more cozy than businesslike.
Even today, when many boards contain large majorities of technically
independent trustees, one might wonder at the extent to which such
legislated independence actually equates with a real freedom to
disavow completely the wishes of the investment adviser.
As has been discussed, only the independent trustees of a board
may participate in the decision to enter into or to renew an advisory
agreement, and a majority of those independent trustees is required to
do so.179 “Independence” in this context is purely a legal determination
that the trustee is not an “interested person” of the mutual fund, as that
term is defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 Act.180 The Act
generally deems interested any person who is an officer or employee
of the fund or its investment adviser,181 or a close family member
177. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61-79 (2004); Bebchuk, supra note 46,
at 843-49; Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 751.
178. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764-83.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000).
181. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(i), (B)(i).
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thereof,182 a lawyer of the fund or its investment adviser,183 or anyone
who has had a significant professional or business relationship with
the fund complex or its investment adviser during the past two and a
half years.184
Of course, this definition fails to deem a grandparent or
grandchild of the investment adviser’s chief executive officer an
interested person; nor would it exclude that CEO’s partner, best friend,
or golfing buddy.185 A wide array of intimate and yet nominally
independent relationships may exist within the regulations. Even the
SEC “recognize[s] that ‘legal’ independence does not equate with
‘real’ independence.”186 Furthermore, although many trustees may join
the board through the efforts of a nomination committee, which itself
is comprised of only independent trustees, the adviser always
participates to some extent in the process. When a fund is first formed,
it is the adviser—as the sole shareholder—who determines who will
be the trustees. Thus, even technically independent trustees are likely
to be known personally to the members of the adviser who have
nominated them, and every subsequent trustee, whether independent
or not, will descend from this initial relationship. Thus, the potential
for nominees to have a personal and preexisting relationship with the
senior management of the adviser is extremely high. Moreover, even if
such a relationship does not exist at the outset of a board member’s
service, collegiality is very likely to develop over the course of service
on any board that meets many times a year.187
Aside from personal connections to the adviser, one must
consider where the independent trustees’ pecuniary interests lie. While
they may, like shareholders, own shares in the funds they oversee,
nothing obliges them to do so. From time to time, shareholders
propose schemes whereby trustees must purchase shares in the funds
they oversee, but shareholder meetings for mutual funds are extremely

182. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).
183. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iv), (B)(iv).
184. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vi), (B)(vi).
185. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19).
186. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004).
187. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 31-34 (“Whether or not a particular
director was appointed during the CEO’s reign, that director is likely to develop a personal
relationship with the CEO as well as with other directors who may be even closer to the
CEO.”).
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rare, and such proposals are typically only precatory.188 On the other
hand, independent trustees receive regular paychecks for their services
to the funds and, on balance, the larger the number of funds and assets
they oversee, the larger their remuneration.189
Fund complexes typically compensate their independent trustees
through either a top-down or bottom-up approach. In a top-down
system, the board fixes a compensation figure for its members, the
cost of which is then borne by all the funds in the complex on a pro
rata basis according to the amount of assets in each fund. A bottom-up
approach involves determining a figure to be paid by each unit of
assets, which are then added up by all the funds in the complex to
arrive at a final sum. If the assets of the complex grow, then this latter
system automatically increases the trustees’ compensation.190 In a topdown approach, trustees may feel more at liberty to increase their own
remuneration when they know that a greater number of shareholders
will bear any added costs. In either system, the trustees’ financial
incentives are linked to the adviser’s with respect to increasing the
assets under management—both trustees and advisers will, on balance,
be paid more when a fund complex has more assets under
management.191 Of course, in order for any assets to be under
management, the trustees must approve an advisory agreement. So, in
order to receive payment for their services, trustees have an incentive
to work with the investment adviser to consummate an agreement.
In addition to these interpersonal and fiscal considerations, board
dynamics also limit the degree to which independent trustees and the
investment adviser interact at a meaningful distance.192 For the typical
188. See Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a
Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD.
277, 286-94 (2001).
189. INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS 21
(1999).
190. See Bonnie Bauman, Fidelity Directors Got “Huge” Pay Raises Last Year,
BOARDIQ, Feb. 8, 2005, at 1, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print/20050208/fidelity_
directors_huge_raises_last_year (subscription required).
191. Interestingly, trustees also receive more compensation when they are forced to
meet more frequently to address pressing issues; such as, for instance, during the heightened
investigative and regulatory climate of the past two and a half years. See Bauman, supra note
101 (“Director pay climbed 13% in 2004, according to a study just released by Management
Practice, a fund governance consulting firm. For the second year in a row, the hike was more
attributable to an increase in the number of board meetings than an increase in board
retainers.”).
192. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 23-44 (“[S]ignificant deviations from
arm’s-length contracting have been common in widely held public companies.”); Bebchuk,
Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764-74.
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board meeting, employees of the adviser are charged with preparing
and distributing materials in advance; portfolio managers and other
executives of the adviser make technical presentations; and, until quite
recently, the chair of the board would almost certainly have been a
high-ranking executive of the adviser. Thus, the adviser, through one
means or another, has a great deal of influence over the content and
tenor of board meetings. More importantly, the adviser, regardless of
whether one of its employees officially chairs the board, controls
access to data about the inner workings of the fund and the adviser.
This combination of personal relationships among the interested and
independent trustees, common financial incentives, and the adviser’s
domination of the board proceedings will inevitably reduce the degree
to which any negotiations over the advisory agreement can truly
operate at arm’s length.
2.

Market Forces

The degree to which the market resolutely guides the board and
the adviser to an optimal pay arrangement also should not be
overstated. Several factors interfere with the theoretically orthodox
conception of a marketplace carefully protected by the beneficent
forces of competition, information, and the wiser shareholders
amongst us.
a.

Competition Amongst Investment Advisers

Although there are, indeed, hundreds of advisers and thousands
of funds from which a shareholder may choose, the managerial labor
market for any particular fund is far from fluid. While, ab initio, an
investor newly arrived to the mutual fund forum can choose only those
funds with the best performance and lowest advisory fees, many
investors are not arriving to the agora unfettered. Many are brought by
their 401(k) plans to a small corner of the emporium and offered only
a limited menu of mutual funds.193 Many others are already
shareholders in mutual funds. Like individual shareholders, each
fund’s board of trustees must also decide on an investment adviser. For
the board, however, the choice relating to investment advisers is not a
wide open selection among the economy’s finest performers; it is,
instead, simply a binary: to renew or not to renew the advisory
agreement with the fund’s current adviser.194
193. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 45-49.
194. See supra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
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While it is theoretically possible for a fund board to decline to
renew an advisory agreement with the fund’s adviser, in practice, such
a termination practically never happens. Changing a fund’s adviser
would, in effect, be to change the very nature of the fund. Suppose a
board were, for example, to fire MFS as the investment adviser of a
global equity fund and to hire, as a replacement, Putnam. One could
reasonably assume that if Putnam were an expert in global equities, it
would already advise a global equity fund in its own complex. Thus,
to the extent that shareholders of the MFS global equity fund are
unhappy with the investment adviser, they do not need to wait for the
board to provide a remedy; rather, they have a ready solution of their
own at hand: they can simply redeem their MFS shares, exit the fund,
and purchase shares of the Putnam fund. To the extent that
shareholders have not made such a switch, the board might assume
that the shareholders are indicating their satisfaction with MFS as the
adviser of the fund. Moreover, because many shareholders invest in a
particular fund to obtain the investment management services of a
specific investment adviser, a board’s decision to change adviser
effectively negates the shareholders’ preference.
Consequently, the termination of advisory agreements is so rare
as to be practically an impossibility. This limitation severely restricts
the ability of a fund’s board to control the management of the fund, a
fact of which investment advisers are acutely aware. Indeed, even
following the unprecedented wave of problems that has deluged the
industry, not one board of trustees has pointed to these developments
and declined to renew an advisory agreement with any investment
adviser.195
Of course, not every investor who refuses to exit a mutual fund is
voicing support for the adviser or its fees. Inertia and ignorance are
potent supporters of the status quo. Some investors may believe that
the board of trustees will protect them from what they believe are truly
excessive fees. In this respect, both the trustees and the shareholders
may be looking to the other party to object to high advisory fees. In
addition, an adviser’s fees may not be so high as to drive away
shareholders and yet still be higher than is optimal. The paradox of an
apparently transparent compensation scheme in which both trustees
195. See Diana B. Henriques, A Sense of History, A Feeling of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2004, at C1 (quoting former industry leader, Michael F. Price: “You know what the
shocking thing to me is? That nobody has had a contract canceled by a board of directors.
Even where a chairman was messing around with the fund, the board didn't cancel the
contract. What does it take to get fired in this business?”).
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and shareholders are familiar with the advisory fees is that neither
group may feel the need to be the ultimate monitor.
b.

Dissemination of Information

Yet if shareholders do have access to advisory fees, perhaps they
ultimately retain the ability to protect themselves by shunning advisers
with high fees. Alas, this option is handicapped by two added
complications that both create a dearth of transparency regarding
advisers’ compensation. First, the amount of information for any given
mutual fund is not just extensive, it is practically overwhelming.196
Second, the true compensation to the adviser is not captured in one
simple number but through a complex agglomeration of multiple
variables.197 So, although most mutual funds do not lock in
shareholder capital and, on the contrary, allow shareholders to redeem
shares easily, the decision to redeem is useless without the knowledge
of when to do so.198
The prospectus and SAI for any given fund in a major complex
can run to well over a hundred pages.199 As any experienced litigator
knows, if one must produce adverse facts, it is often best to do so
amidst an avalanche of documents. When advisers disclose their
advisory fees, they may provide information for each different class of
shares that a particular fund offers and include provisos for redemption
fees,200 exchange fees,201 account fees,202 temporary fee waivers,203

196. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements of
Form N-1A).
197. In fact, one major mutual fund complex—the UMB Scout family of funds—is
now considering a plan to unbundle its fees, so that the board will be able to assess and to
control specific expenses. See Bonnie Bauman, UMB Scout Funds Revamp Fee Structure,
BOARDIQ, Feb. 8, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print20050503/more_time_more_
money_directors (subscription required).
198. See Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean, and Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows (December 2003), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=496315 (documenting, inter alia, no relation between fund flows and
operating expenses charged by brokerage firms).
199. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying note 80 and source cited therein. The ICI defines a
redemption fee as a fee “paid to a fund to cover the costs, other than sales costs, involved with
a redemption.” INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 20.
201. “This [exchange] fee may be charged when an investor transfers money from one
fund to another within the same fund family.” Id.
202. Account fees “may be charged by some funds, for example, to cover the costs of
providing services to low-balance accounts.” Id. When an investor’s holdings in a fund drop
to a sufficiently low level, the account fee is designed to prevent the transfer agent from
incurring a loss on handling the administrative tasks associated with the account.
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distribution fees,204 and other idiosyncratic expenses. If one asked a
portfolio manager what the cost is to invest in his or her mutual fund,
the answer is almost sure to be, “It depends.” Class A shares include
front-end sales charges (or loads), class B shares include contingent
deferred sales charges or back-end loads which vary with the amount
of time the shares are held, and some class C shares include neither
front- nor back-end loads but feature higher fees across the life of the
investment.205 In addition, the purchase of a certain threshold of shares
might entitle the investor to lower fees on the marginal amounts above
certain price breakpoints. For the average shareholder, then,
determining the precise cost to invest in any given mutual fund rivals
the complexity of calculating the exact cost of a home mortgage with
its innumerable fees and closing costs. The fund’s advisory fee and the
mortgage’s interest rate are prominent and important guideposts, but
they hardly tell the whole story.
These computations are also complicated for the board, which
must conclude whether to approve of the fees. As with the
compensation of an operating company’s CEO—which might
comprise a complicated equation of signing bonuses, deferred
compensation, pension benefits, and stock options—the compensation
of an investment adviser is a similarly convoluted function of several
variables.206 For the trustees of a board that oversees dozens, scores, or
even hundreds of mutual funds, the ability to sort through this
information—even if provided in convenient reports by Lipper207—is
203. In some recent settlement agreements, investment advisers have agreed to lower
the fees they charge investors, though typically only for a finite number of years. See, e.g.,
Riva D. Atlas, Janus Agrees to Lower Fees in $225 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2004, at C5 (“The Janus Capital Group said yesterday that it would lower fees on its mutual
funds as part of a $225 million settlement with regulators over improper trading in its funds.
The New York attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, demanded the fee reduction of $125 million
over five years . . . .”); see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer,
Salazar Announce Market-Timing Settlement with Janus Capital Management, LLC (Apr.
27, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/apr/apr27a_04.html (agreeing to
pay a $125 million in fee reductions over a five-year period).
204. The distribution (12b-1) fee, “if charged, is deducted from fund assets to
compensate sales professionals for providing services to mutual fund shareholders in
connection with the purchase and sale of shares or the maintenance of accounts, and to pay
fund marketing and advertising expenses.” INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 21.
205. See Rochelle Kauffman Plesset & Diane E. Ambler, The Financing of Mutual
Fund “B Share” Arrangements, 52 BUS. LAW. 1385, 1385 & n.1 (1997).
206. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 775-78 (“The typical CEO’s
compensation package is composed of a base salary, an annual bonus, stock options and/or
restricted shares, and often other long-term incentive elements.”).
207. Some critics contend that even intermediaries who are expert in compiling and
analyzing pricing information, such as Morningstar and Lipper, do a poor job of advising
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constrained by the time and expertise that the trustees bring to their
positions which are, after all, only part-time.
c.

Protection from Sophisticated Shareholders

If average shareholders cannot count on boards to guarantee their
financial well being and are unable to parse the fee disclosure for
themselves, perhaps they can at least rely upon their more savvy fellow
investors to serve as sentinels and to police the system for them. With
pension plans, university endowments, and other mutual funds
investing in funds, surely their full-time staffs of financial
professionals wield sufficient clout and expertise to determine
precisely whether any given investment adviser has exceeded the
optimal level of fees. And surely these institutional investors will then
use their influence to bring back into line any high fees to arrive at an
optimal level of compensation for the adviser and the shareholders.
More importantly, investment advisers should be sufficiently afraid of
driving away the considerable business of institutional investors to
avoid setting fees so high as to lose their custom.
Indeed, these institutional investors bring their influence to bear
on the pricing system for mutual fund shares. But rather than crosssubsidizing the less sophisticated mutual fund investors amidst them,
they do what any healthy person would, if able, when surrounded by an
ailing population: they exit the pool altogether. Institutional investors
invest in mutual funds through their own class of shares, which come
with a customized pricing system far more advantageous to the
investors than the typical retail share. Subject to a steep minimum
investment, these institutional shares offer far lower advisory and other
fees to the funds’ most valuable investors.208 Thus, the presence of
investing experts in their midst does little to guarantee average
investors an optimal pricing system.209

shareholders. See, e.g., David F. Swensen, Unconventional Success: A Fundamental
Approach to Personal Investment 178-181 (2005) (“The highly touted Morningstar rating
system reinforces the investing public’s unfortunate tendency to focus on past performance.
Purely statistical, backward-looking calculations provide no help in identifying superior
managers.).
208. Institutional investors may be required, for instance, to purchase a minimum
investment of $1 million, in exchange for which their assets will be subject to an advisory fee
many basis points lower than that of the ordinary, retail investor.
209. Indeed, some regulators, such as the office of the New York Attorney General,
have entered settlement agreements pursuant to which fund boards must consider the pricing
discrepancies between the retail and investment share classes of the funds they oversee.
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Corporate Law Remedies

The limitations of lawsuits are well known to potential plaintiffs,
regardless of whether their complaints originate from the excesses of
operating company executives or investment advisers. Even under the
best of circumstances, such derivative suits are extremely difficult to
win, given the demand and futility requirements, the protection
afforded trustees by the business judgment rule, the ability of a board
to protect itself with a special litigation committee, and all the other
impediments to success at both trial and appeal.210
While an operating company may offer an investment
opportunity that truly is sui generis, the majority of mutual funds are
not very difficult to replicate with competitors’ offerings.211 Therefore,
while many fund shareholders may proceed unaware of shortcomings
of their advisory fees, if such a shareholder were to grow sufficiently
agitated to consider bringing an action to produce a judicially decreed
optimal advisory fee, surely a far simpler alternative would exist well
before trial: the shareholder could simply redeem his or her shares and
reinvest them in a more amenably priced competitor.
Corporate law is, of course, not entirely impotent with respect to
bringing redress to wronged shareholders. Indeed, if the events of the
past two and a half years have demonstrated anything, it is the power
of regulatory action to identify and ameliorate industry excesses. Prior
to this full-scale regulatory assault on investment advisers, however,
shareholders either did not know how to, or did not care to, initiate
private litigation in any concerted way.212 Thus, the courts by
themselves did little to guide boards and advisers toward optimal
investment advisory agreements.

210. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 779-82 (“[C]orporate law permits
shareholders to challenge a particular compensation package under a variety of doctrines.
However, the obstacles to the success of such a lawsuit all but ensure that courts never review
the substantive merits of management compensation arrangements.”).
211. See, e.g., The Motley Fool, No-Load Index Funds, http://www.fool.
com/mutualfunds/indexfunds/table01.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (listing 17 no-load
S & P 500 index funds).
212. When such suits have been brought in the past, however, a landmark decision has
established a standard that has, to date, been insurmountable. See Gartenberg v. Merrill
Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982) (“To be guilty of a violation of § 36(b),
therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it
bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product
of arm’s-length bargaining.”).
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The Managerial Power Hypothesis

The optimal contracting approach suggests that, when present,
arm’s-length negotiation, market forces, and corporate law will impel
boards and managers to negotiate compensation schemes that
optimally align the interests of shareholders and managers.213
Arguably, the current investment advisory industry does not satisfy
those three criteria and perhaps, therefore, the absence of optimal
contracts in the industry is not surprising. Of course, in the storm of
recent upheavals, no one has proved that the advisory agreements
between mutual funds and their advisers are less than optimal. Instead,
the allegations have focused on a host of other activities by the
advisers to the detriment of the funds and, by extension, their
shareholders. The optimal contracting approach provides no guidance
as to how or why such behavior may have occurred. The managerial
power hypothesis, on the other hand, does.
The managerial power hypothesis, like the optimal contracting
approach, begins with an acknowledgement of the “agency problem
inherent in the manager-shareholder relationship.”214 Unlike the
optimal contracting approach, however, the managerial power
hypothesis sees executive compensation not as the remedy to the
agency problem but as “part of the problem itself.”215 Many of the
limitations of the optimal contracting approach arise from the fact that
managers possess power sufficient to pervert the course of arm’slength bargaining. The managerial power hypothesis predicts that, in
such situations, managers will use their power to extract rents, in the
form of “compensation more favorable than they would get under
Extending this perspective to the
arm’s-length bargaining.”216
investment management context, one might expect investment advisers
with sufficient power vis-à-vis the board of trustees to exact rents from
the funds that they manage.
Indeed, as we have already seen, many investment advisers do
possess a great deal of power in interactions with boards of trustees.
By virtue of running all aspects of a mutual fund every day, the senior
executives of an adviser are far more familiar with the operations,
trading strategies, investment success, and regulatory compliance of
that fund than the members of the board, who meet to discuss the fund
213.
214.
215.
216.

See, e.g., Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 61.
Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 784.
See id. at 787.
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only on a part-time basis. Moreover, what the board discusses at those
occasional meetings is subject, in large part, to the agenda, reports, and
presentations provided to the board by the employees of the adviser. If
a board has suspicions of malfeasance, it can certainly consult its
separate legal counsel, but the board can hardly subject the adviser to a
constant audit of its operations.
In its original incarnation, the managerial power hypothesis
suggested that the CEO or other individual officers of an operating
company might have power ascendant over the company’s board to
extract rents.217 When one aggregates the influence of the entire
management and personnel of a mutual fund into the single investment
adviser entity, there can be little doubt that the collective unit has the
upper hand with the fund’s board of trustees. Not only is the manager
in the mutual fund context—that is, the investment adviser—more
powerful than the prototypical CEO, but the board of trustees is weaker
than the typical operating company’s board of directors. While firing a
CEO is not an easy matter, doing so is far more straightforward than
terminating an advisory contract, which, as I have discussed, is
tantamount to terminating the going enterprise of the mutual fund.218
While relatively rare, CEO terminations are eminently more common
than terminations of advisory contracts.219
Furthermore, mutual fund boards are also incapable of wielding
direct authority over employees of the investment adviser. While the
board of an operating company can choose to discipline any employee
in the company, a mutual fund board has no such authority. The
individuals who work with a mutual fund are employees not of the
fund but of the investment adviser and, as such, do not report to the
board of trustees but to the board of directors of the adviser. So
although a fund board can express a pointed opinion to the investment
adviser and exert indirect pressure, it cannot directly retain, promote,
or terminate an employee of the adviser. The mutual fund board is
thus deprived of a line-item veto; if it feels deeply enough to wish the
dismissal of an individual, it must threaten the termination of the entire
advisory relationship. In sum, the board of trustees of a mutual fund
217. See id. at 784-86.
218. See supra text accompanying note 195.
219. In fact, recently, the termination of a chief executive officer has become
somewhat common. See, e.g., Steve Bailey, A Matter of Governance, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
18, 2005, at E1 (“Corporate boards are suddenly showing the backbone their many critics
have been demanding for years. And big-name CEOs are falling like dominoes.”); Pui-Wing
Tam, Fallen Star: H-P’s Board Ousts Fiorina as CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at A1
(discussing the ouster of former Hewlett-Packard chief executive and chair, Carly Fiorina).
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possesses many of the same responsibilities to its shareholders as does
the board of an operating company but without anywhere near the
same array of tools.
Aside from terminating the investment advisory contract, a board
of trustees has perhaps only one instrument of consequence: public
complaint. If a board is convinced that an adviser is behaving badly or
failing to cooperate, the board can threaten to voice its concern to the
SEC or otherwise make its displeasure known publicly. Particularly in
today’s environment of heightened regulatory scrutiny, such a threat is
likely to grab the adviser’s attention and may restore some balance of
power with the adviser. Similarly, the board can address its concerns
to the shareholders of a fund, many of whom are also sensitive to the
lingering whiff of impropriety abroad in the industry. At a time when
investors have only recently withdrawn billions of dollars from funds
tainted by regulatory investigations,220 an adviser might well be
concerned that shareholders offered any reason for concern by their
trustees would be quick to abandon a fund. Of course, like all
shepherds, boards can threaten such outcries only a few times before
they lose their potency.221
Notwithstanding its criticism of the optimal contracting
hypothesis, the managerial power perspective “does not imply that
there are no constraints at all on compensation and the rents that
[managers] can capture.”222 On the contrary, the hypothesis is acutely
aware of the outrage that compensation arrangements particularly
favorable to managers might spark.
If an executive’s compensation arrangement goes far beyond what could
be justified under optimal contracting and is perceived that way by
outsiders, those outsiders might become angry and upset. If this
outrage is sufficiently widespread and intense, it limits the extent to
223
which compensation can be increased in a number of ways.

Investment advisers are similarly sensitive to public censure of their
compensation, which could easily prompt substantial redemptions
from their mutual fund, which would reduce the assets under their
management and, in turn, the fees they receive from advising those
220. See Joe Morris, More Big Players Hit with Outflows, IGNITES, June 25, 2004,
http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040625/more_players_with_outflows (“[In May
2004,] Fidelity had the worst showing of the group, with an estimated $2 billion in
net withdrawals. It had taken in a net $2.5 billion in April.”).
221. See AESOP, AESOP’S FABLES 78 (Laura Gibbs trans., 2002).
222. Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 786.
223. Id.
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funds. In many ways, this theory is almost more suited to the
investment advisory context than to operating companies, since
advisory fees are such a critical ingredient in the decision to invest in a
mutual fund. While it is true that an investor might be willing to
ignore high advisory fees if a fund is garnering lucrative returns, as a
general matter, those fees will have a stronger bearing on an investor’s
decision to buy mutual fund shares than the compensation of an
operating company’s chief executive will influence an investor’s
decision to buy that company’s shares.
To minimize outrage and its attendant deleterious effects, a
manager will, according to the managerial power approach, seek to
reduce the degree to which his or her hunger for compensation is
perceived by outsiders. “Because perceptions are so important, the
designers of compensation plans can limit outside criticism and
outrage by dressing, packaging, or hiding—in short, camouflaging—
rent extraction.”224 This camouflage typically takes the form of
perquisites, stock options, benefits, and other forms of remuneration to
the executive that are either less easy to comprehend than a simple
salary or are more capable of being disguised. In applying this theory
to the investment management context, one might equate advisory fees
to an executive’s salary. To what, then, would one compare these
disguised perks, options, and benefits? Possibly to the morass of
additional fees and expenses buried in funds’ prospectuses. But if
investment advisers are more powerful than executives, and mutual
fund boards of trustees are weaker than operating company boards of
directors, one might expect the managerial power hypothesis to apply
with even greater force in the investment advisory context. With that
premise in mind, perhaps the accretion of disguised benefits is more
widespread in the mutual fund context. And perhaps the litany of
problems that have recently beset the industry are best thought of as
investment advisers’ disguised attempts to accrue additional rents.
V.

CAMOUFLAGED EXTRACTIONS OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE

Investment advisers are commonly ranked by the amounts of
assets they manage.225 Because their own wealth is such a direct
function of those assets under management, the metric is also an easy
224. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 67.
225. See, e.g., Lipper Home Page, supra note 150. Note that new SEC rules restrict
the degree to which investment advisers may advertise by touting the past performance of the
funds they manage. See Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, Investment
Company Release No. 26,195, 68 Fed. Reg. 57,760, 57,761 (Oct. 6, 2003).
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proxy for the advisers’ success. For every new dollar of assets in one
of its funds, an adviser will realize perhaps a penny or two or maybe
even something less in advisory fees. But when those assets grow to a
flood of billions of dollars, advisers’ profits soon become real money.
Of course, amounts like these do not come free from potential
conflicts of interest. Advisers constantly face situations in which they
must choose between their own pecuniary advancement and their
shareholders’ best interests. A dynamic shared by many of the mutual
fund irregularities of the past two and a half years is the choice by
culpable advisers to increase the assets under their management at the
expense of their shareholders’ interests.
Of course, there are many benign and even affirmatively good
explanations for the growth of assets in a mutual fund, and chief
among them is an adviser’s canny investment decisions that have
enlarged a fund to the benefit of all the shareholders. Larger funds
can, in theory, enjoy economies of scale from savings on transaction
costs which may be shared among investors.226 These beneficent
justifications for the growth of assets under management may help to
disguise the advisers’ own profit, thereby allowing advisers to reap
superoptimal value without detection. In each of the mutual fund
improprieties examined below,227 the advisers’ power to control the
operations of the fund explains how they positioned themselves to
extract rents from their shareholders.228

226. Economies of scale may be passed on to shareholders in funds through the use of
sales-load breakpoints. That is, a fund may offer a discount on the sales charges it imposes
on fund shares in proportion to the amount of a shareholder’s investment, such that the more
money an investor puts into a fund, the less he or she has to pay in sales charges. If an
investor invests $100,000 in a fund, for instance, his or her sales load may be 3.75%; but if he
or she increases the investment to $500,000, the load will drop to 2.00%. One of the
improprieties that recently came to light involves investment advisers failing to honor these
breakpoints and not giving large shareholders their appropriate discounts.
227. Abuses have also been reported in yet other areas of the fund industry, such as
529 plans. Recently, the state of Utah fired the head of its 529 plan and accused him
of stealing money earmarked for the plan. Dale Hatch, deputy executive director
of the state’s higher education assistance authority, has been accused of
committing fraud by skimming money budgeted for administering the plan and
putting it into 529 accounts he owned. See Jane J. Kim, Director of “529” Plan Is
Dismissed , WALL S T. J., July 12, 2004, at C15.
228. Please note that some of the following discussions regarding abuses use
hypothetical fact patterns to illustrate the species of malfeasance in question. Others,
however, are based on the specific allegations contained in settlement orders signed by
regulators and investment advisers. As those settlement agreements rarely contain
admissions of liability, however, assume all facts are merely “alleged.”
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A. Market-Timing
One allegation that featured prominently at the initial press
conference in which Eliot Spitzer declared malfeasance in mutual
funds was market-timing.229 Unlike some of the behavior that has
subsequently been alleged, market-timing is not illegal per se.230
Indeed, in some respects, the timing of entrances and exists from the
market has been a strategy long encouraged by prudent investors—
after all, much market behavior is governed by certain cyclical trends,
so taking account of that calendar is only reasonable and certainly not
against the law. Herein lies one of the sources of confusion with this
topic: the term “market-timing” has no fixed definition in the
extensive investment advisory literature and regulations. As investigations by the SEC and others evolved, however, regulators eventually
made clear that the market-timing of which they disapproved
encompassed a variety of investing techniques involving arbitrage of
mutual fund share prices through the use of timed transactions.231
Perhaps the best example of market-timing involves time-zone
arbitrage, a strategy in which investors attempt to exploit inefficiencies
in the pricing of mutual fund shares by scheduling investments
according to the behavior of markets across far reaches of the globe.232
Consider, for instance, an American mutual fund whose portfolio of
underlying securities consists solely of a diverse array of Japanese
equity securities traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. At 4:00 p.m.
Eastern time each business day, the fund must determine its NAV by
calculating the value of its Japanese holdings (and then adding to that
figure any other assets the fund owns, subtracting any liabilities, and
dividing that number by the number of fund shares outstanding). The
easiest, and often most reliable, indication of the worth of any publicly
traded security, Japanese or otherwise, is the price at which it last
traded on a public securities exchange. The American fund therefore
would, in all likelihood, use the closing price on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange for their Japanese securities to determine its own NAV.

229. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, supra note 1.
230. See Disclosure Regarding Market-timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300, 22,301-05
(Apr. 23, 2004).
231. See id.; see also text accompanying and sources cited supra note 21 (discussing
specific settlements with MFS and Alliance).
232. Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual
Funds, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245, 246 (2003).
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The potential problems with using the Japanese closing price
become very apparent when one considers that the Tokyo Stock
Exchange closes at 1:00 a.m. Eastern time233—fully fourteen hours
before the American fund calculates its NAV. Imagine, for instance
that at 3:00 a.m. Eastern time, a massive earthquake strikes the city of
Kobe in Japan. Or, on the other hand, that at 4:00 a.m. Eastern time,
the Japanese central bank lowers interest rates by a full point more than
expected. In either case, the Tokyo Stock Exchange will not open—
and therefore not be capable of reflecting these important
developments—until 8:00 p.m. Eastern time, four hours after the
American fund must calculate its NAV. In essence, by using the
closing prices (which predate news that will certainly move the
market) for its Japanese stocks, the American fund is trapped in time
and operating in the past.
To a savvy investor, news of the earthquake or the drop in interest
rates presents an ideal opportunity to arbitrage. By selling shares of
the American fund on bad news, the investor will exit the fund before
the price of the fund’s shares drop, thereby avoiding a certain loss. By
buying shares on good news, the investor will enter the fund before the
price of the fund’s shares rise, thereby locking in guaranteed gains.
After all, the American fund will not react to these developments until
the following day, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange will have opened,
moved significantly up or down, and closed again. If an investor is
poised and ready to move huge sums of money into and out of the
American fund, it can garner significant profits through this strategy.
Mutual funds are, of course, advised by savvy portfolio managers
who are not unaware of these investing techniques. Those managers
are not bound in any way to use stale closing prices to calculate the
fund’s NAV. In fact, on the contrary, they are obliged to value their
portfolio securities fairly, which means that they can depart from
closing prices if those values are manifestly inaccurate.234 In such
instances, a fund may retain the services of a third-party pricing
consultant that specializes in ascribing a fair value to securities—or
any other portfolio holdings—for which market prices are not readily
available or, in the aforementioned examples, for which market prices

233. See Tokyo Stock Exchange Web site, http://www.tse.or.jp./English/index.shtml
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
234. See Ciccotello, supra note 97, ¶¶ 33-35; see also infra text accompany notes 245248 (discussing the fair valuation of portfolio securities).
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do not accurately reflect true value.235 While any experienced portfolio
manager can anticipate the effects that an earthquake or interest-rate
adjustment will have on the market and can, accordingly, deploy fair
valuation strategies to counterbalance those effects, many more subtle
events that are harder to obviate can also present opportunities for
arbitrage.
Market-timing arbitrageurs do not wait impotently for acts of
God to present them with chances to make money. They have learned
how to interpret and exploit the effects of much more nuanced
occurrences. Even the movement of other world markets, for instance,
could create predictable effects on a broad index of Japanese securities.
Imagine that after the close of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the New
York Stock Exchange were to rise a certain percentage on the strength
of positive developments in the U.S. economy. Such a rally would,
with a certain degree of correlation, impact the other markets in the
world. Thus, market timers can again move their funds into or out of
funds accordingly.236
Of course, market-timing is not illegal per se. Indeed, some
might argue that markets benefit from arbitrage, which encourages
greater pricing accuracy. Nevertheless, the market-timing of mutual
funds is not harmless. Market timers extract profits, and avoid losses,
at the expense of longer-term shareholders who have not moved their
assets in and out of the fund.237 By moving large blocks of cash into a
fund in anticipation of a rise in the fund’s value, the market timer
dilutes the worth of each individual share of the fund.238 Although the
timer’s new cash was not invested in the underlying securities whose
value has risen, the investment has increased the number of fund
shares outstanding.239 Thus, with a greater denominator, the NAV
equation results in profits from positive market movements being
shared by a greater number of shareholders.240
In addition, the rapid movements of large amounts of cash in and
out of a mutual fund create inefficiencies in the management of the
235. The leading provider of third-party fair valuation services is Investment
Technology Group, Inc., which markets its ITG Fair Value Model as “an independent, reliable
way to establish fair value prices. In historical buck-tests of actual portfolios, the ITG Fair
Value Model has significantly reduced the opportunity for market-timing by generating price
adjustments that better approximate the next trade of fund holdings.” See Investment
Technology Group, http://www.itginc.com/research/fvm.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006)).
236. See Ciccotello et al., supra note 97, ¶¶ 8-10.
237. See id. ¶¶ 8-11.
238. See id. ¶¶ 16-20.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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fund.241 With the arrival of $20 million, for example, in a $100 million
fund, the portfolio manager must scramble to invest the cash to
maximize investment returns in the fund. Similarly, if a timer redeems
$20 million from the same fund, the portfolio manager may have to
liquidate certain positions before an opportune moment to sell. Such
timing movements also come with transaction costs shared by all
shareholders of the fund. Economically, then, market-timing is
deleterious to the interests of long-term shareholders. For that reason,
many investment advisers prohibit market-timing in their mutual funds
and proscribe such activity in their funds’ prospectuses.242
Because market-timing is lucrative, however, certain arbitrageurs
are willing to “pay” for the opportunity to do it. In exchange for the
ability to move $25 million rapidly in and out of a particular fund, for
instance, a market timer might offer to leave untouched $50 million of
“sticky” assets in a different fund in the adviser’s complex.243 Such an
arrangement, of course, pits the interests of the shareholders of the
timed fund against the interests of shareholders in the fund with sticky
assets. More importantly, though, this arrangement pits the adviser’s
financial interest against its shareholders’ interest. Although the
shareholders of the timed fund will forfeit value to the market timer,
the adviser will garner higher advisory fees from the additional sticky
assets under management. While an adviser may allow investors to
market time its funds without running afoul of the law, it cannot do so
in violation of its own prospectus. Thus, the advisers who faced
prosecution by the SEC and other regulators in connection with this
activity were those who publicly claimed that they did not allow
market-timing while furtively striking deals with hedge funds and
other investors to facilitate it.244

B.

Fair Valuation

As the market-timing abuses demonstrate, one key function that
an investment adviser must regularly perform is the valuation of each

241. See id. ¶¶ 21-22.
242. See Mass. Fin. Servs., File No. 3-1193 (Feb. 5, 2004), Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2213, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (setting forth
a total settlement of $225 million).
243. A market timer may offer to park the sticky assets in a fund, such as a hedge fund,
that provides the investment adviser with a substantially higher management fee than the fund
that is being timed.
244. See id.; Brewster, supra note 13, at 19.
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of its fund’s portfolios.245 In essence, this process calls for the adviser
to calculate its own fees. If the adviser concludes that the fund’s assets
are worth a great deal, it will receive more revenues from advisory
fees; if it concludes that they are worth less, it will receive less.
Needless to say, the adviser’s incentive to inflate the value of the fund’s
assets is manifest.
The urge and ability to manipulate the value of a fund’s portfolio
is diminished a great deal by the use of objective market quotations for
underlying securities, as any competent audit would quickly uncover
fraud on the part of the adviser. When an adviser departs from market
quotations, the risk of arbitrariness—or worse, bias—in the valuation
of the portfolio becomes pronounced. Thus, fund boards maintain a
pricing committee whose responsibility is to oversee any assets for
which market quotations are not readily available.246
One such asset is a security for which available market prices are
obviously stale.247 Others include portfolio holdings that are highly
illiquid, such as investments in companies that are not publicly traded.
If a company that is not publicly traded last sold its shares in a private
placement a long time in the past, an adviser and the pricing
committee may have a difficult time determining a fair value for those
245. See Alison Sahoo, SEC: Fair Valuation Guidance Coming Soon, IGNITES, Aug. 5,
2004,
http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040805/fair_valuation_guidance_coming_
soon.htm.
246. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § (a)(41)(B), Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B) (2000)); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2005); Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 118 (1994);
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Accounting Standards No. 113 (1992).
247. Independent trustees—in addition to inside counsel, compliance officers, and
accountants—have been held liable for their failure to fulfill their valuation duties. In 1998,
the SEC for the first time named independent trustees in a cease-and-desist proceeding when
it filed charges against Parnassus Investments, investment adviser to the Parnassus Fund. An
administrative law judge subsequently held that the independent trustees had aided and
abetted the overstatement of the fund’s NAV by failing to value appropriately the fund’s
investment in Margaux, Inc., of which it owned 565,000 shares of common stock and a
$100,000 note convertible into 1.5 million additional shares. Parnassus Investments, et al.,
Initial Decision Release No. 131, Administrative Proceeding, File no. 3-9317, 1998 SEC
LEXIS 1877 (Sept. 3, l998). Throughout a two-year period in the early 1990s, the fund had
ascribed an identical value to its Margaux investment, notwithstanding a series of negative
events that occurred during that time, including the company’s bankruptcy, its delisting from
NASDAQ, and an investigative report linking Margaux’s products to the sale of spoiled meat
by its largest customer. Id. At the end of the two-year period, the fund eventually did reduce
its carrying value of the Margaux investment from $0.344 to $0.20 per share when Morgan
Stanley downgraded the customer’s shares from “buy” to “hold.” Id. The following year, the
fund further reduced the carrying value of its investment to $0.15 per share as a result of
further financial difficulties at Margaux. Id. Ultimately, the fund sold its investment in
Margaux for $0.24 per share. Id.
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shares. Unless the board and its pricing committee pay close attention
to these determinations, an adviser might be tempted to inflate values
of these holdings. Any affirmative decision to increase the value of a
holding is likely to draw attention, but an adviser can achieve a similar
effect by failing to reduce the value of a stock that clearly has fallen.
Imagine a privately held biotechnology company.248 If a mutual
fund were to purchase shares in the company immediately following
successful clinical trials of a flagship treatment, one might expect the
fund to pay a premium for the company’s shares. If six months pass
without any additional round of fundraising or other valuation event
for the company, the fund’s adviser might be justified in continuing to
carry the investment at the same value. If the Food and Drug
Administration were then to refuse to approve the company’s
treatment, any reasonable observer would conclude that the value of
the company’s equity—and any investment in it—had fallen,
regardless of whether the company records such a decline overtly as a
result of the sale of any more of its shares. Under such circumstances,
if the fund’s adviser failed to adjust the value of its investment
downward, the fund’s assets under management would be artificially
inflated. Shareholders in the fund would, therefore, be paying too
much for the adviser’s services.
As a general matter, the procedures by which an adviser prices its
illiquid holdings and uses a fair valuation service are monitored by the
board of trustees. Given the duties of the board, the trustees’ other
commitments, and the number of securities in which a fund complex is
invested, however, one must wonder to what extent a pricing
committee is capable of monitoring all the external developments that
could affect the true value of the funds’ portfolios. Certainly, the
adviser’s control of the pricing of fund assets gives it the ability to
manipulate these equations to its own financial benefit.

C.

Late-Trading

Together with market-timing, Eliot Spitzer in his watershed press
conference also accused mutual fund advisers of facilitating latetrading.249 Like market-timing, late-trading allows investors to time
their movement in and out of mutual funds, typically on the heels of
breaking news; unlike market-timing, however, late-trading is
unequivocally illegal. Late-trading is the practice of placing or
248. See id.
249. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, supra note 1.
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canceling orders to buy or sell mutual fund shares after the 4:00 p.m.
deadline (as of when mutual funds determine their NAV).250
Mutual fund shares are priced once a day, after the close of the
market.251 Law-abiding investors who wish to purchase shares in a
fund can place an order during business hours and will receive the
fund’s next available price, which is that day’s NAV. Imagine a
hypothetical situation in which Bank of America announces, a few
minutes after the close of the market, that it is acquiring Fleet Bank.
One can safely assume that, upon the opening of the market the next
morning, the value of shares in Fleet will rise. If one had placed an
order during business hours to buy shares of a mutual fund heavily
invested in Fleet, the news would have no impact on that day’s NAV,
which was calculated as of 4:00 p.m. using closing prices that had not
yet reflected the merger announcement. Of course, the next day’s NAV
would almost certainly rise to reflect the increase in Fleet shares, and a
lucky investor could sell his or her shares the following day to realize
that gain.252
Some investors, however, are not interested in being lucky. If
they purchased shares in the fund after the merger announcement, and
yet still received the stale NAV, they could be assured of enjoying an
easy profit from the bounce in share price. The process by which
funds price their shares creates administrative gaps into which
unscrupulous investors can place late trades. The process of gathering
a day’s orders to buy and sell a fund is not instantaneous; it takes time,
often several hours. During that time, brokers and other financial
intermediaries are gathering and relaying their clients’ orders to each
mutual fund’s administrator. At various steps along the way, an
intermediary or the investment adviser can insert an extra order, or
delete one. As with market-timing, if a fund’s underlying securities
rise in value, cash from newly arrived investors only dilutes the gains
that would otherwise have been enjoyed by the existing shareholders.253
250. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50,360,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,595 (Sept. 14, 2004) (setting forth SEC allegations
of late-trading).
251. See Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388, 70,390-91 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003).
252. Although the facts used in this example are hypothetical, actual late-trading
allegations are set forth in settlement agreements entered into by the SEC and a number of
financial intermediaries. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., Securities Exchange Release No.
50,360, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,595 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50360.htm.
253. See Ciccotello et al., supra note 97, ¶ 16.
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So, like market-timing, facilitating late-trading breaches the adviser’s
fiduciary duties.
Of course, pulling or placing late trades would also be an
extremely generous favor for an investment adviser to perform for
valued customers. An adviser could use such a strategy to retain and
entice large investors to its funds, which would naturally increase the
assets under management in its funds. Here, again, the adviser’s
managerial influence in the operations of its funds creates an
opportunity for it to extract additional value from shareholders.254

D.

Selective Disclosure

Another douceur that an investment adviser could offer to its
favored customers as a way to entice them to deposit their assets in the
adviser’s funds is particularized information about the precise portfolio
holdings of the adviser’s mutual funds.255 While funds must disclose
certain information about their top holdings in SEC filings, such
disclosure is incomplete and infrequent.256 Often, the investing public
learns of a fund’s holdings only well after the fact, at which point the
information is too stale to exploit.
If an investor learns contemporaneously about the holdings or,
even better, in advance, he or she can take advantage of that knowledge
by “front-running” the fund.257 Consider, for example, an investor who
knows that a large mutual fund has a goal of maintaining ten percent of
its assets in Microsoft and rebalances its holdings each month. If the
investor then learns that the fund’s holdings of Microsoft have dropped
to eight percent toward the end of the month, he or she can readily
ascertain that the fund will soon have to make a large purchase of
Microsoft stock to adhere to its investing policies. An investor with the
ability and inclination might aim to buy as much Microsoft stock as
possible before the mutual fund does; that is, to front run the fund’s
purchase. Then, when the mutual fund, with its billions of dollars,
begins buying huge blocks of the stock, the value of the shares will rise
as a natural consequence of the purchasing activity. The investor in
possession of the selectively disclosed fund information will benefit
254. See id. ¶¶ 21-22.
255. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Investment Company Act Release
No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
256. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103, 240.10b5-1 to -2, 249.308 (2005).
257. See generally Samuel L. Hayes III, The Impact of Recombining Commercial and
Investment Banking, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 49-50 (2004) (examining the current regulatory
scheme and problems confronting it).
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from a quick and definite increase in its newly purchased securities.
Of course, the converse phenomenon of avoiding losses is equally
possible by selling shares prior to a fund’s large-scale liquidations.
These trades will raise the cost or lower the proceeds for the
mutual fund that makes its transactions afterwards. Accordingly, the
shareholders of the fund will gain incrementally fewer profits or incur
incrementally larger costs on the fund’s transactions. These amounts
may seem negligible to any given shareholder, but of course, therein
lies the genius of extracting rents from mutual fund shareholders: any
particular act of exploitation may generate substantial profits to an illbehaving individual while ostensibly impacting each victim very little.
As one journalist covering the behavior characterized it: “If you want
to steal a lot of money and get away with it, steal a little from a lot of
people. They will probably never notice. If they do, they may not
think it worth the effort to complain.”258
In this way, an investment adviser can dispense259 portfolio
holding information as an incentive for sophisticated and wealthy
investors to station their assets in the adviser’s funds, raising the
adviser’s assets under management and, consequently, its advisory
fees.260

E.

Revenue-Sharing

The business of investment management revolves primarily
around two different categories of securities: the shares of each mutual
fund that the adviser markets to the investing public (fund shares), and
the underlying investments that the adviser buys and sells in order to

258. Floyd Norris, Pile of Pennies Is Adding up to a Scandal in Mutual Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at C1.
259. Of course, this behavior is essentially an investment advisory analog to insider
trading. Traders are making use of material nonpublic information. See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (“We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of
investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security's
price change dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for
that move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.”).
260. A hybrid of malfeasance by selective disclosure and insider trading is illicit
employee trading. At the same time that an adviser can provide valuable information about
portfolio holdings to its favored customers, it can also use the information for its own benefit.
Or, more accurately, the adviser’s employees can take advantage of the information for their
own benefit. Portfolio managers, who are the employees of an investment adviser most
intimately familiar with a fund’s holdings and future plans, can just as easily capitalize on
their insider knowledge by front-running fund transactions.
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produce gains for shareholders in the fund (portfolio securities).261
While an investor who wishes to participate in mutual funds may use a
broker/dealer to purchase and redeem fund shares, so, too, will an
investment adviser use a broker/dealer to buy and sell portfolio
securities. Indeed, the broker/dealer in the two sets of transactions may
even be the same entity.262
If a portfolio manager decides that a mutual fund that he or she
oversees should purchase $25 million worth of shares in Exxon-Mobil,
for instance, the manager will relay the order to the investment
adviser’s trading desk. Employees at the trading desk will then contact
broker/dealers about the purchase, and the broker/dealers will quote
the trading desk prices at which they will execute the trade. Those
quotations may vary, such that the adviser would incur higher or lower
transaction costs depending on which broker/dealer it selects to
execute the trade. Federal regulations impose upon the adviser a duty
to use “best execution” in transactions on behalf of the fund’s
shareholders.263
“Best,” however, does not necessarily mean
“cheapest.”264
Imagine two quotations from two different broker/dealers. The
first offers to place the trade at five cents a share. The second offers to
place the trade at seven cents a share but includes with the bid a
package of extensive research on the petrochemical industry. If the
value of the research it receives outweighs the cost of the additional
two cents per share it will have to pay for the trade, an adviser might
reasonably conclude that the second offer is “best.” That research is a
tool that the adviser can use to do a better job in its role as the manager
of the fund’s assets, and Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act creates a
safe harbor for advisers from liability for paying more than the lowest
possible commission rate if the advisers use the additional
commissions to pay for research services.265

261. Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund
Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1277
(2006) (“Unlike other securities, mutual fund shares are sold at a fixed price set by the fund
based on the current net asset value of the fund’s portfolio securities.”).
262. See Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,341, 69 Fed.
Reg. 6438, 6439 (Feb. 10, 2004).
263. See Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices, Release No. 3443,084, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,409 (Proposed Aug. 8, 2000).
264. See id.
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000); Securities, Brokerage and Research Services,
Release No. 23,170, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,004, 16,005 (Apr. 30, 1986).
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The scope of Section 28(e), however, is quite limited.266 Advisers
might be tempted to pay for all manner of services through inflated
commission fees because they, in fact, are not the ones paying. Mutual
fund shareholders pay those transaction fees. Consider an example: In
exchange for charging highly inflated commissions, a broker/dealer
offers an investment adviser the use of commercial real estate to open
a branch office. Bear in mind that the adviser already receives a
stream of revenues from which it must pay its operational expenses:
the advisory fees it charges shareholders. Under such an arrangement,
the fund’s shareholders would be paying the adviser twice—once
directly through advisory fees, then a second time in the form of
inflated transaction costs.
When one considers the enormous volume of trading activity of
portfolio securities in which investment advisers engage, the value of
the commissions it pays quickly becomes evident. While Section
28(e) attempts to limit the manner of tangible inducements that
broker/dealers can use to attract trading business, creative financial
executives have nevertheless devised a particularly appealing offering
that many advisers have been unable to resist: “shelf space.”267 In the
grocery business, one component that factors into the price a retail
establishment pays a wholesale provider of goods is the prominence
the retailer is willing to give those goods. For example, if a cereal
producer offers a grocery store a lower price, the store may be willing
to place boxes of Chocolate Frosted Sugar Bombs268 at kids’-eye level.
As in the grocery business, prominent shelf space is highly prized
in the investment advisory industry. With thousands of mutual funds
from which to choose, customers strolling the aisles of broker/dealers
may need some assistance. Morgan Stanley, for example, may
therefore offer a list of twenty preferred mutual funds to its customers
to help guide their decision.269 With such a prominent position, the
funds on that list can be assured of a rise in sales of their fund shares.
266. See Securities, Brokerage and Research Services, Release No. 34-23,170, 51 Fed.
Reg. 16,004, 16,005 (Apr. 30, 1986).
267. The SEC uses the term “shelf space” to mean “heightened visibility within
[broker/dealers’] distribution systems.” Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2224, Investment Co. Act Release No. 26,409, SEC Docket 2036 (Mar. 31,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2224.htm.
268. The Calvin and Hobbes Searchable Database, http://www.trangsmogrifier.org/ch/
comics/search.cgi? (search “Chocolate Frosted Sugar Bombs”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
269. Morgan Stanley was, in fact, implicated in revenue sharing wrongdoing by the
SEC and settled the matter for $50 million. See Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 8339, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48,789, 81 SEC Docket 1993 (Nov.
17, 2003).
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In consideration for the valuable shelf space—and the sale of fund
shares sure to follow from it—an adviser might be willing to direct a
good portion of its trading activity in portfolio securities to Morgan
Stanley, even if Morgan Stanley’s commissions might not necessarily
satisfy the requirements of best execution.
While the fund’s shareholders may pay inordinate transaction
costs in such an arrangement, prominent shelf space will insure that
money from new investors will flow into the fund. As the assets under
management rise, so too of course do the investment adviser’s fees.
Thus, once again, advisers are faced with a conflict between their own
interest and their shareholders’ interest, while the managerial power
they wield over fund’s arcane trading activities gives them the ability to
extract value surreptitiously at the shareholders’ expense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scope of illicit behavior uncovered in the investment
management industry over the past two and a half years is
breathtaking. In creative and diverse ways, investment advisers have
repeatedly used their control over vast sums of money to advance their
own fiscal interests at the expense of the shareholders for whom they
are fiduciaries. While the nature of these abuses has varied widely—
from bargains with market timers to complicity with late traders to
overpayments for trading commissions—one dynamic has almost
always been involved. Employees of the adviser used the power of
their intimate knowledge of mutual fund operations to increase the
assets they managed and thereby to enhance their own revenues, while
a board of trustees without resources or influence stood by impotently.
The optimal contracting approach suggests optimistically that a
well-crafted advisory agreement will harmonize the interests of the
adviser and the shareholders but fails to account for this type of selfdealing behavior by the adviser. The managerial power hypothesis,
however, when extended in a novel approach from the executive
compensation paradigm to the investment advisory context, explains
why and how advisers had both the motive and the opportunity for
extracting rents from shareholders in this bacchanal of malfeasance.
In response to the deluge of improprieties, the SEC and other
authorities have already passed a number of new regulations.270 By and
270. See Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,262 (Jun. 14, 2004); Investment Company
Governance, Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004);
Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Advisers Act Release No. 2256, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696

2006]

THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY

1465

large, though, these new rules do not proscribe the behavior of advisers
so much as demand more disclosure. In the view of the SEC, the
problem with market-timing, for example, was not so much the
practice as the failure to disclose what was really happening. Yet
mutual fund shareholders are already overwhelmed by hundreds of
pages of disclosure and hardly have an interest in reading more fine
print about what their advisers may be doing. In fact, the current
disclosure regime is so excessive that the SEC is once again
considering overhauling its forms to rejuvenate a system that has
grown clogged by so many new regulations.
To be effective, of course, any additional regulation requires
additional oversight. But while the SEC’s budget is scheduled to
remain unchanged this fiscal year, a new rule will soon take effect that
will bring hedge fund advisers under regulatory review.271 With
thousands of new advisers and funds to monitor, how can the SEC
possibly increase its vigilance of mutual funds?
With trillions of dollars already under management and untold
more possibly to come some day through Social Security reform,272 the
industry must embrace changes beyond the merely cosmetic. The
depth and breadth of the recent irregularities strongly suggests that
superficial patches will not be a long-term solution.

(July 9, 2004); Company Act Release No. 26299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 17, 2003);
Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act
Release No. 2204.
271. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
272. See supra text accompanying note 8 and sources cited therein (discussing the
range of projected dollars that might flow into mutual funds in the wake of Social Security
reform).

